LIBRARY 

UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA 
DAVIS 


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THE 

POLITICAL    CONSPIRACIES 
PRECEDING    THE    REBELLION 

OR 

THE  TRUE  STORIES  OF  SUMTER 
AND    PICKENS 

BY 

THOMAS   M.    ANDERSON 

LIEUT.    COL.    U.    S.    A. 


NEW    YORK 

G.    P.    PUTNAM'S    SONS 

27   &    29   WEST   23D    STREET 
1882 


LIBRARY 

UNIVERSITY  OF  (JALIFORNIA 
DAVIS 


COPYRIGHT    BY 

G.  P.  PUTNAM'S  SONS 
1882 


DEDICATION 


TO    THE    OLD    FRIENDS   OF 

GENERAL  ROBERT  ANDERSON 

THIS   MONOGRAPH    IS    RESPECTFULLY    INSCRIBED    BY 

» 

THE    AUTHOR 


CHAPTER  I. 

"O  Conspiracy! 

Sham'st  thou  to  show  thy  dangerous  brow  by  night, 
When  evils  are  most  free  ?    Oh  !  then,  by  day 
Where  wilt  thou  find  a  cavern  dark  enough 
To  mask  thy  monstrous  visage  ?    Seek  none,  Conspiracy  ; 
Hide  it  in  smiles  and  affability : 
For  if  thou  put  thy  native  semblance  on, 
Not  Erebus  itself  were  dim  enough 
To  hide  thee  from  prevention." 

JULIUS  CESAR. 

I  PURPOSE  in  this  monograph  to  give  an 
account  of  the  political  conspiracies  immedi 
ately  preceding  the  Rebellion  of  1861  against 
the  authority  of  the  National  Government  of  the 
United  States  of  America. 

It  would  be  absurd  to  assume  that  one  of 
the  greatest  civil  wars  of  modern  times  was  the 
result  of  conspiracies. 

The  causes  which  led  to  it  were  far  too  deep 
and  strong  to  be  controlled  by  the  machinations 
of  politicians. 

Nevertheless  the  outbreak  of  the  Rebellion 
was  preceded  by  a  number  of  conspiracies  the 
object  of  which,  so  far  as  the  Southern  leaders 
were  concerned,  was  to  gain  certain  advantages 


2  POLITICAL    CONSPIRACIES 

by  cunning  &&&  finesse  before  they  resorted  to 
the  arbitrament  of  war. 

These  plots  are  naturally  connected  with  the 
sieges  of  Forts  Sumter  and  Pickens,  with  which 
the  struggle  began. 

In  regard  to  the  mere  physical  facts  of  the 
siege  of  Sumter  there  is  no  mystery  or  dispute. 
But  as  to  the  political  history  which  gives  it  im 
portance,  as  to  the  complications  which  cul 
minated  in  the  first  passage  at  arms  in  the  war, 
there  has  been  almost  as  much  discussion  as 
there  has  been  as  to  the  guilt  or  innocence  of 
Mary  of  Scotland. 

What  pledges,  if  any,  did  Mr.  Buchanan  give 
to  the  South  Carolina  Commissioners  ? 

What  understanding,  if  any,  did  he  have  with 
Messrs.  Barnwell,  Adams,  and  Orr  as  to  the  re- 
enforcement  or  evacuation  of  the  forts  in  Charles 
ton  Harbor? 

What  pledges,  if  any,  did  Mr.  Seward  subse 
quently  give  in  relation  to  Sumter  ? 

Was  Major  Robert  Anderson,  its  commander, 
deterred  by  orders  or  by  his  sympathy  with  the 
South  from  opening  fire  on  the  Confederates 
when  they  began  placing  batteries  around  him  ? 

All  these  questions  have  been  mooted  and 
discussed  heretofore  with  much  less  intelligence 
than  zeal. 


PRECEDING  THE  REBELLION.         3 

Now  at  last  the  publication  of  the  official 
records  gives  us  a  fair,  critical,  and  historical 
standpoint. 

After  the  October  elections  in  the  fall  of  1 860 
had  been  carried  by  the  Republicans,  the  elec 
tion  of  Mr.  Lincoln  in  November  became  a 
foregone  conclusion.  Knowing  this,  the  people 
of  South  Carolina  took  no  pains  to  conceal  their 
intention  of  seceding  from  the  Federal  Union  as 
soon  as  the  result  of  the  Presidential  election 
was  known.  As  the  day  of  the  election  ap 
proached,  the  people  of  Charleston  manifested 
such  a  turbulent  and  rebellious  spirit,  that  the 
engineer  officer  in  charge  of  the  construction 
parties  working  on  the  forts  in  the  harbor  asked 
for  permission  to  arm  a  number  of  his  workmen 
to  protect  the  ordnance  and  ammunition  stored 
in  Fort  Sumter. 

On  the  ist  of  October  (1860)  the  Chief  of 
Ordnance  wrote  to  Mr.  Floyd,  the  Secretary 
of  War,  recommending  that  the  request  of  the 
engineer  officer  be  complied  with,  provided  it 
met  the  approval  of  the  commanding  officer  of 
Fort  Moultrie.  Singularly  enough  Mr.  Floyd 
approved  this  application. 

The  commanding  officer  of  Fort  Moultrie, 
when  the  matter  was  referred  to  him,  gave  a 
very  hesitating  approval  of  the  application,  ex- 


4  POLITICAL   CONSPIRACIES 

pressing  grave  doubts  of  the  loyalty  and  relia 
bility  of  the  workmen  engaged  on  the  forts, 
and  closed  his  letter  (written  November  8th) 
by  a  recommendation  that  the  garrison  of  Moul- 
trie  should  be  re-enforced,  and  that  both  Forts 
Sumter  and  Castle  Pinckney  should  be  garri 
soned  at  once  by  companies  sent  from  Old  Point 
Comfort  (Fort  Monroe).  Subsequently  he  or 
dered  the  ordnance  officer  at  the  Charleston 
Arsenal  to  turn  over  to  him,  for  removal  to  Moul- 
trie,  all  the  small  arms  and  fixed  ammunition  he 
had  in  store.  The  attempt  to  make  this  trans 
fer  was  successfully  resisted  by  the  Charleston 
mob,  and  the  attempt  abandoned. 

This  action  of  the  commander  of  the  troops 
in  the  harbor,  and  his  application  for  re-enforce 
ments,  led  to  his  prompt  removal.  The  officer 
thus  summarily  dealt  with  was  Lieut.  Colonel 
J.  L.  Gardner,  ist  Artillery,  a  native  of  Massa 
chusetts,  and  an  old  veteran  who  had  entered 
the  service  in  1813.  The  South  Carolina  Com 
missioners,  in  their  correspondence  with  Presi 
dent  Buchanan,  reminded  him,  with  scant  cour 
tesy,  that  Colonel  Gardner  had  been  removed 
at  the  dictation  of  the  South  Carolina  delegates, 
because  he  had  called  for  re-enforcements  and 
recommended  the  occupation  of  Fort  Sumter 
and  Castle  Pinckney. 


PRECEDING   THE  REBELLION.  5 

Major  Robert  Anderson  was  ordered  to  re 
lieve  this  officer  and  take  command  of  Fort 
Moultrie  on  November  i5,  1860. 

If  the  Southern  cabal  that  controlled  the 
War  Department  supposed  that  he  would  prove 
more  pliant  and  less  loyal  than  his  predecessor 
they  soon  discovered  their  mistake. 

Robert  Anderson  was  born  in  Kentucky  in 
i8o5.  Both  his  father's  and  mother's  family 
came  from  England  to  Virginia  in  1636,  and 
removed  from  Virginia  to  Kentucky  at  the  close 
of  the  War  of  Independence.1 

Eight  of  his  blood  relations  were  officers  in 
the  Continental  Army.  His  father,  the  Lieut- 
Colonel  of  the  ist  Virginia  Continental  Infantry, 
had  been  wounded  at  the  battles  of  Trenton  and 
Savannah,  and,  singularly  enough,  had  fought  at 
Charleston  and  had  been  taken  prisoner  there 
by  the  British. 

He  subsequently  acted  as  A.  D.  C.  to  General 
Lafayette  in  his  campaign  against  Corn wallis  that 
ended  in  the  siege  and  capture  of  Yorktown0 

At  the  close  of  the  Revolutionary  War  he 

1  Major  Anderson's  relatives  in  the  Continental  Army  were  :  R.  C. 
Anderson,  Lieut. -Col.  ist  Va.;  Capt.  John  Anderson,  3d  Va.  Inft.; 
Capt.  Wm.  Croghan,  4th  Va.  Inft.;  Capt.  John  Marshall,  7th  Va. 
Inft.  (afterward  Chief-Justice  U.  S.) ;  Brig.-Genl.  George  Rodger 
Clark;  Lieut. -Col.  Jonathan  Clark,  8th  Va.  Inft.;  Capt.  Geo.  An- 
derson,  provisional  navy. 

The  members  of  his  family  who  were  officers  of  the  Regular  and 
Volunteer  forces,  during  the  war  of  the  Rebellion  were  as  follows  : 


6  POLITICAL    CONSPIRACIES 

was  selected  by  the  officers  of  the  Continental 
Army  to  survey  and  locate  the  generous  gift  of 
public  land  given  to  them  by  the  State  of  Vir 
ginia.  This  selection  was,  I  believe,  made  at 
the  first  meeting  of  the  Society  of  the  Cincin 
nati.  That  he  might  carry  out  this  work,  he 
was  made  first  Surveyor-General  of  the  Virginia 
military  land  district. 

This  present  of  land  was  all  that  the  Conti 
nental  officers  received  for  their  seven  years' 
service  in  the  war  for  independence.  In  pro 
posing  one  of  their  number  to  apportion  to  each 
his  distributive  share,  they  naturally  selected  a 
man  in  whose  integrity  and  justice  they  had 
perfect  confidence. 

This  high  sense  of  honor  Major  Anderson 
inherited  from  his  father.  A  more  honest, 
honorable,  and  chivalrous  man  never  lived, 
He  was  a  Southerner,1  and  in  a  proper  sense 

Brig.-Genl.  Robert  Anderson ;  Col.  Chas.  Anderson,  636.  Ohio 
Vol.  (subsequently  Governor  of  Ohio)  ;  Col.  N.  L.  Anderson,  6th 
Ohio  Vol.;  Col.  A.  L.  Anderson,  1st  Cal.  Vol.;  Capt.  Wm.  P. 
Anderson,  6th  Ohio  Vol.  (A.  A.  G.  Dept.  of  Ohio) ;  Capt,  E.  L.  An 
derson,  A.  D.  C.;  Maj.-Genl.  Stanley  ;  Capt.  F.  P.  Anderson,  A.  D. 
C.;  Maj.-Genl.  Schofield ;  Capt.  H.  R.  Anderson,  3d  U.  S.  Vol.; 
Major  John  Simpson,  I54th  Ind.  Vol.;  Lieut. -Col.  Thomas  M.  An 
derson  of  the  Regular  Army  ;  Surg.  Richard  Logan,  Ky,  Vol.,  U. 
S.  A. 

1  The  following  are  the  more  prominent  officers  of  our  army  and  navy 
who,  although  Southerners  by  birth,  remained  faithful  to  the  National 
Government. 

In  the  Army:  Winfield  Scott,  Geo.  H.  Thomas,  Ord,  Pope, 
Rosseau,  Meigs,  Harney,  Frank  Blair,  Buchanan,  Buford,  Bayard, 
R.  H.  Williams,  McKeever,  Jos.  Taylor,  Jas.  Marten,  Easton, 


PRECEDING  THE  REBELLION.         ^ 

was  a  Southern  sympathizer.  He  loved  his 
State  and  he  loved  his  friends,  and,  from  acci 
dental  associations,  most  of  his  friends  were 
Southerners.  But  few  men  ever  lived  who  came 
so  near  having  no  political  opinions  and  sympa 
thies  whatever.  He  probably  never  voted  in  his 
life.  He  used  to  say  that  his  father's  religion 
and  General  Washington's  politics  were  good 
enough  for  him.  The  Ten  Commandments, 
the  Constitution  of  the  United  States,  and  the 
Army  Regulations  were  his  guides  in  life.  For 
the  subject  of  this  essay,  for  the  political  prob 
lem  which  his  conduct  subsequently  brought  to 
the  test  of  practical  solution,  he  cared  as  little 
as  any  man  of  his  day. 

He  was  sincerely  religious  and  a  soldier  of 
antique  character  and  courage.  Above  all,  he 
was  a  follower  of  his  flag.  To  him  it  was  like 
a  sacrament,  an  outward  sign  of  an  inward  grace. 
It  was  his  symbol  of  duty.  He  always  saw  upon 
its  folds  "  In  hoc  signo  vinces." 

In  the  war  that  followed,  eleven  of  his  immedi- 

Tompkins,  Murray,  Cuyler,  Simons,  Wm.  Hammond,  J.  F.  Ham 
mond,  Newton,  Benit,  Laidley,  Baylor,  Davidson,  Royall,  E.  B. 
Alexander,  A.  J.  Alexander,  Dent,  Getty,  T.  L.  Crittenden,  Marrow, 
Elwell  Otis,  Lugenbeel,  Dodge,  Sprig,  Carroll,  Cooke,  Ramsey,  Holt, 
Brice,  T.  J.  Wood,  Emery,  Paul,  Mclntosh,  R.  W.  Johnson  Lang, 
Seawell,  Hunter,  French,  Graham  (old  Pike),  Burke  (old  Martin). 

In  the  Navy :  Farragut,  John  Rodgers,  Patterson,  Fairfax,  Hop 
kins,  Carter,  Burrett,  Young,  Jouett,  Russell,  Stribling,  Powell, 
Craven,  Radford,  Turner,  Lee,  Jenkins,  Sands,  Steedman,  Taylor, 
Scott,  Stembel,  Middleton,  Bache,  Homer,  Ward,  Palmer,  and 
Harlan,  all  of  high  rank. 


8  POLITICAL   CONSPIRACIES 

ate  family,  including  himself,  held  commissions 
in  the  Union  Army. 

With  these  antecedents  and  influences,  it 
would  have  been  strange  indeed  if  Robert  An 
derson  had  not  been  loyal  to  his  country. 

Nevertheless  it  is  true,  beyond  reasonable 
doubt,  that  the  Secretary  of  War,  when  he  sent 
him  to  take  command  of  the  forces  in  Charles 
ton  Harbor,  fully  believed  that  he  would  obey 
all  his  orders  and  finally  throw  his  fortunes 
with  the  South. 

The  first  letter  he  received  from  Major  An 
derson  after  he  assumed  command  of  Moultrie, 
dated  November  23,  1860,  must  have  shaken 
his  faith. 

In  it  he  explains  the  gravity  of  the  situation 
and  the  inadequacy  of  his  means  of  defence  ; 
expresses  the  conviction  that  the  people  of 
South  Carolina  intended  to  seize  all  the  forts  in 
the  harbor  by  force  of  arms  as  soon  as  their 
ordinance  of  secession  was  published ;  he  en 
larges  on  the  importance  of  Sumter  and  Castle 
Pinckney,  demands  reinforcements,  notifies  the 
War  Department  that  he  will  send  in  a  requisi 
tion  for  a  supply  of  ordnance  for  all  the  forts, 
and  says,  finally  :  "  Fort  Sumter  and  Castle 
Pinckney  must  be  garrisoned  immediately  if 
the  government  determines  to  keep  command 


PRECEDING   THE  REBELLION.  9 

of  the  harbor."  The  italics  are  his  (page  76, 
vol.  i,  "  Rebellion  Records"). 

In  passing  through  Washington  City  on  his 
way  to  Charleston,  Major  Anderson  had  seen 
President  Buchanan  and  the  Secretary  of  War. 
By  the  latter  at  least  he  had  been  cautioned  to 
avoid  all  collision  with  the  people  of  Charleston, 
to  avoid  disturbance,  not  to  excite  them,  and  so 
on,  in  this  strain  of  conciliatory  weakness.  His 
subsequent  letters  and  instructions  were  all 
pitched  in  the  same  key. 

There  is  no  telling  what  disapproval  and  re 
proof  Major  Anderson's  first  letter  might  not 
have  brought  down  on  his  head,  for  a  much  less 
decided  letter  had  caused  the  removal  of  Col 
onel  Gardner,  had  not  a  new  and  unexpected 
element  been  introduced  into  the  controversy. 

The  venerable  patriot,  Lewis  Cass,  the  Secre 
tary  of  State,  suddenly  denounced  submission 
as  treasonable,  and  supported  Major  Anderson's 
demand  for  reinforcements.  Two  other  mem 
bers  of  the  Cabinet  seem  to  have  supported  Mr. 
Cass.  This  was  a  political  bomb-shell,  and  with 
this  begins  the  political  history  of  the  Sumter 
episode. 

To  appreciate  fully  the  situation  we  must  re 
call  the  names  of  the  men  then  in  power  at 
Washington. 


IO  POLITICAL    CONSPIRACIES 

James  Buchanan  and  John  C.  Breckenridge 
were  President  and  Vice- President.  Buchanan's 
first  Cabinet  were  Cass,  Cobb,  Floyd,  Toucey, 
Thompson,  Holt,  and  Black.  Jefferson  Davis 
was  Chairman  of  the  Military  Committee  in  the 
Senate.  The  men  in  control  of  the  War  De 
partment  were  Floyd,  Cooper,  Joe  Johnson, 
Taylor,  Craig,  De  Russy,  Don  Carlos  Buell, 
Fitz-John  Porter,  and  Withers. 

In  the  Cabinet,  Cobb,  Floyd,  Toucey,  and 
Thompson  were  rebels  or  submissionists.  They 
had  the  ear  of  the  President.  In  the  War  De 
partment,  Floyd,  Cooper,  Johnson,  Taylor,  and 
Withers  were  Southerners.  Taylor,  Craig,  and 
De  Russy  were  loyal,  but  had  no  influence. 
Buell  and  Porter  afterward  proved  loyal,  but  at 
that  time  were  in  Floyd's  confidence,  or  at  least 
Floyd  had  confidence  in  them.  Porter,  then 
Assist.  Adjutant-General,  made  an  inspection  of 
the  forts  in  Charleston  Harbor  a  few  days  be 
fore  Anderson  reached  there.  His  attention 
had  evidently  been  called  to  the  importance  of 
Castle  Pinckney  by  Colonel  Gardner,  for  in  his 
report  he  says  of  it : 

"  Castle  Pinckney  commands  Charleston,  and 
its  armament  is  complete.  Here  the  powder 
belonging  to  the  arsenal  in  the  city  is  stored. 
A  company  can  be  accommodated  here,  while  a 


PRECEDING    THE  REBELLION.  II 

small  force  under  an  officer  would  secure  it 
against  surprise  or  even  a  bold  attack  of  such 
enemies  likely  to  undertake  it." 

But  he  had  not  the  moral  courage  to  recom 
mend  its  occupation.  The  report  closes  with 
this  sentence  and  signature  of  evil  omen  : 
"  Under  present  circumstances  I  would  not  rec 
ommend  its  occupation.  Very  respectfully,  etc., 
F.-J.  Porter,  Assistant  Adjt-General  "  (page  72, 
Ibid.). 

Why  not  recommend  it  ?  Oh,  bitter  shame 
to  us ! 

Within  two  months  we  have  a  set  of  so- 
called  Commissioners  writing  to  the  President 
of  this  nation  these  insulting  words  : 

"  For  the  last  sixty  days  you  have  had  in 
Charleston  Harbor  not  force  enough  to  hold  the 
forts  against  an  equal  enemy.  Two  of  them 
were  empty,  one  of  those  two  the  most  impor 
tant  in  the  harbor ;  it  could  have  been  taken  at 
any  time.  You  ought  to  know  better  than  any 
man  that  it  would  have  been  taken  but  for  the 
efforts  of  those  who  put  their  trust  in  your 
honor."  Signed.  "  Barn  well,  Adams,  Orr." 

Thanks  to  this  peace-at-any-price  policy,  this 
was  an  insult  we  had  to  endure.  The  circum 
stance  that  prevented  an  officer  of  the  United 
States  Army  from  recommending  the  occupation 


12  POLITICAL   CONSPIRACIES 

of  a  United  States  fort,  was  the  threat  of  a  rebel 
mob. 

General  Porter's  report  was  written  on  the 
nth  of  November.  On  the  I2th  Mr.  Humph 
ries,  the  ordnance  store -keeper  at  Charleston 
Arsenal,  writes  to  the  Chief  of  Ordnance  : 

"  Sir. — In  view  of  the  excitement  now  exist 
ing  in  this  city  and  State,  and  the  possibility  of 
an  insurrectionary  movement  on  the  part  of  the 
servile  population,  the  governor  has  tendered, 
through  General  Schnierle,  of  South  Carolina 
Militia,  a  guard  of  a  detachment  of  a  lieutenant 
and  twenty  men  for  this  post,  which  has  been 
accepted." 

What  delightful  protection  !  How  disinter 
ested!  The  wolves  offer  to  protect  this  pet 
lamb  against  the  geese  !  On  the  2Oth,  Brevet 
Colonel  Benjamin  Huger,1  U.  S.  A.,  soon  of  the 
C.  S.  A.,  assumes  command  of  the  arsenal  by 
order ;  he  writes  back  at  once  "  that  Mr.  Humph 
ries'  prudence  and  discretion  meet  his  com 
mendation."  So  a  wolf  in  sheep's  clothing  was 
sent  down  to  defend  the  fold. 

Next  in  order  we  have  a  letter  from  S. 
Cooper,  Adjutant-General,  U.  S.  A.y  soon  to  be 

1  Huger,  pronounced  Hugee.  Benj.  Huger  was  a  graduate  of  the 
Military  Academy  in  the  class  of  1825.  He  was  twice  brevetted  for 
gallantry  in  battle  in  the  Mexican  war.  He  resigned  from  the  Federal 
army  in  1861,  was  made  a  Major-General  in  the  Confederate  army, 
and  led  the  advance  of  Lee's  army  at  the  battle  of  Malvern  Hill. 


PRECEDING    THE  REBELLION.  13 

Adjutant-General,  C.  S.  A.,  asking  Anderson  as 
to  the  condition  "  of  the  work  under  his  com 
mand  "  (Fort  Moultrie). 

In  reply  (November  28th),  Major  Anderson 
politely  intimates  that  he  considers  himself  in 
command  of  all  the  works  in  the  harbor,  and  will 
put  in  estimates  for  ordnance  to  arm  them  all. 

"  Your  letter,"  he  says,  "  confines  my  answer  to 
what  refers  to  the  work  under  my  charge.  I  can 
not  but  remark  that  I  think  its  security  from  at 
tack  would  be  more  greatly  increased  by  throw 
ing  garrisons  into  Castle  Pinckney  and  Fort 
Sumter  than  by  any  thing  that  can  be  done  in 
strengthening  the  defences  of  this  work."  Fur 
ther  on  he  says,  in  reply  to  the  suggestion  of 
the  honorable  Secretary  of  War  about  th  ex 
pediency  of  employing  reliable  persons  not  con 
nected  with  the  military  service  for  purposes  of 
fatigue  and  police,  "  I  must  say  that  I  doubt 
whether  such  could  be  obtained  here."  This 
was  a  patriotic  suggestion  of  the  Hon.  J.  B. 
Floyd,  who  subsequently  resigned  his  place  in 
the  Cabinet  because  President  Buchanan  had  re 
fused  to  adhere  to  his  promise  as  Secretary  of 
War,  that  the  forts  in  Charleston  Harbor  should 
not  be  reinforced  or  their  status  changed. 

Mr.  Floyd  fully  intended  in  this  way  to  se 
cure  the  forts  in  the  harbor  to  the  Charleston 


14  POLITICAL   CONSPIRACIES 

people.  For  the  same  reason  he  allowed  the 
work  of  construction  and  repair  to  be  carried  on 
by  the  Engineers.  He  knew  that  the  people  of 
South  Carolina  had  declared  their  intention  of 
seizing  the  forts  as  soon  as  their  State  Conven 
tion  had  passed  their  ordinance  of  secession. 
Yet  with  charming  consistency  we  find  him 
sending  this  telegram  to  Captain  Foster  of  the 
Engineers  : 

I  have  just  received  a  telegraphic  dispatch  informing 
me  that  you  have  removed  forty  muskets  from  Charles 
ton  Arsenal  to  Fort  Moultrie.  If  you  have  removed  any 
arms  return  them  instantly.  Answer  by  telegraph 

JOHN  B.  FLOYD, 

Secretary  of  War. 

Colonel  Huger  had  pledged  himself  to  the 
Governor  of  South  Carolina  that  no  arms  should 
be  removed  from  the  arsenal. 

The  Secretary's  telegram  was  dated  December 
19,  1860,  the  day  before  the  South  Carolina 
ordinance  of  secession  was  passed. 

All  of  the  occurrences  above  narrated  were 
prior  to  this  portentous  date. 

Did  President  Buchanan  know  of  these 
pledges  and  orders  ?  Did  they  have  his  con 
currence  and  approval?  Or  did  he,  as  Judge 
Black  now  asserts,  wish  to  send  reinforcements 
to  Major  Anderson  ? 


PRECEDING    THE  REBELLION.  15 

On  December  8th,  four  of  the  members  of 
the  South  Carolina  Congressional  delegation 
went  to  see  the  President  about  the  forts  in 
Charleston  Harbor.  On  the  Qth,  five  of  them 
signed  the  following  joint  note  : 

His  Excellency,  JAMES  BUCHANAN, 

President  of  the  United  States  : 

In  compliance  with  our  statement  to  you  yesterday,  we 
now  express  to  you  our  strong  convictions  that  neither 
the  constituted  authorities,  nor  any  body  of  the  people  of 
the  State  of  South  Carolina,  will  either  attack  or  molest 
the  United  States  forts  in  the  harbor  of  Charleston  pre 
viously  to  the  action  of  the  Convention,  and,  we  hope  and 
believe,  not  until  an  offer  has  been  made,  through  an  ac 
credited  representative,  to  negotiate  for  an  amicable  ar 
rangement  of  all  matters  between  the  State  and  Federal 
Government,  provided  that  no  reinforcement  shall  be  sent 
into  those  forts,  and  their  relative  military  status  shall 
remain  as  at  present. 

JOHN  MCQUEEN, 
WM.  PORCHER  MILES, 
M.  L.  BONHAM, 
W.  W.  BOYCE, 
LAWRENCE  M.  KEITT. 
Washington,  December  9,  1860. 

In  Mr.  Buchanan's  letter  to  Barn  well,  Adams, 
and  Orr,  the  South  Carolina  Commissioners, 
written  December  31,  1860,  after  quoting  the 
above  letter  and  referring  to  the  interview  that 
followed,  he  says  :  "It  is  well  known  that  it 


1 6  POLITICAL   CONSPIRACIES 

was  my  determination,  and  this  I  freely  ex 
pressed,  not  to  reinforce  the  forts  in  the  harbor, 
and  thus  produce  a  collision,  until  they  had  been 
actually  attacked,  or  until  I  had  certain  evidence 
that  they  were  about  to  to  be  attacked."  (Page 
117,  Ibid.) 

Further  on,  in  reply  to  their  demand  for  the 
withdrawal  of  all  the  troops  from  the  harbor,  he 
said  :  "  This  I  cannot  do  ;  this  I  will  not  do. 
Such  an  idea  was  never  thought  of  by  me  in 
any  possible  contingency." 

As  to  this  statement,  the  South  Carolina 
Commissioners  and  two  of  the  South  Carolina 
Congressmen,  Miles  and  Keitt,  gave  the  Presi 
dent  the  lie  circumstantial,  if  not  the  lie  direct. 
("  Rebellion  Records,"  pp.  120  to  128,  vol.  i.) 

In  this  connection  the  Commissioners  wrote 
to  him  :  "  You  did  not  reinforce  the  garrisons 
in  the  harbor  of  Charleston.  You  removed  a 
distinguished  and  veteran  officer  from  the  com 
mand  of  Fort  Moultrie  because  he  attempted  to 
increase  his  supply  of  ammunition.  You  re 
fused  to  send  additional  troops  to  the  same  gar 
rison  when  applied  for  by  the  officer  appointed 
to  succeed  him.  You  accepted  the  resignation 
of  the  oldest  and  most  efficient  member  of  your 
Cabinet  rather  than  allow  these  garrisons  to  be 
strengthened.  You  compelled  an  officer  sta- 


PRECEDING    THE  REBELLION.  I/ 

tioned  at  Fort  Sumter  to  return  immediately  to 
the  arsenal  forty  muskets  which  he  had  taken 
to  arm  his  men."  General  Cass  had  resigned 
his  office  of  Secretary  of  State  on  the  i/th  of 
December,  1860,  for  the  avowed  reason  that 
the  President  had  refused  to  reinforce  Ander 
son,  and  was  negotiating  with  open  and  avowed 
traitors. 

In  1812  General  Cass  had,  in  conjunction 
with  General  McArthur,  preferred  charges 
against  General  Hull  for  surrendering  a  United 
States  fort  to  a  foreign  enemy.  He  could  not, 
with  any  consistency,  consent,  as  a  Cabinet 
Minister,  to  the  adoption  of  a  line  of  policy 
that  would  legitimately  lead  to  a  surrender  of 
important  defensive  works  to  a  domestic  foe. 
But  so  far  Mr.  Buchanan's  course  had  been  con 
sistent  with  his  declaration  in  his  annual  mes 
sage,  "  that  he  had  no  right,  and  would  not  at 
tempt,  to  coerce  a  seceding  State." 

How  did  it  happen  that  he  so  soon  laid 
himself  open  to  charges  of  tergiversation,  in 
consistency,  and  duplicity  ? 

We  must  turn  back  a  little  and  refer  to  some 
earlier  events,  now  necessary  to  consider.  Ma 
jor  Anderson  had  been  sent  to  Charleston  by 
order  of  Lieutenant-General  Scott.  Before  this 
order  had  been  issued,  Anderson  had  been  sum- 


1 8  POLITICAL    CONSPIRACIES 

moned  to  Washington  by  telegraph  (November 
12th).  His  order  to  relieve  Colonel  Gardner 
was  dated  :  Headquarters  of  the  Army,  New 
York  City,  November  i5,  1860. 

Anderson's  first  official  letter  was  sent  through 
the  regular  channels.  But  he  was  ordered  by 
the  Secretary  of  War,  November  28th,  to  ad 
dress  his  communications  in  future  only  to  the 
Adjutant-General  or  direct  to  the  Secretary 
(page  77).  From  this  time  forth  Major  Ander 
son  could  only  communicate  with  the  enemies 
of  his  government,  and  could  only  receive  his 
orders  from  those  who  were  plotting  its  destruc 
tion.  It  is  only  fair  to  remember  this,  in  con 
sidering  Judge  Black's  assertion  that  General 
Scott  was  responsible  for  the  failure  to  reinforce 
Sumter. 

There  is  reason  to  believe  that  the  President 
himself  was  not  made  acquainted  with  all  that 
was  transpiring. 

On  December  27th  the  following  message 
was  delivered  to  the  President  from  General 
Scott. 

Since  the  formal  order,  unaccompanied  by  special  in 
structions,  assigning  Major  Anderson  to  the  command  of 
Fort  Moultrie,  no  order,  intimation,  suggestion,  or  com 
munication  for  his  government  and  guidance  has  gone 
to  that  officer,  or  any  of  his  subordinates,  from  the  Head 
quarters  of  the  Army  ,  nor  have  any  reports  or  communi- 


PRECEDING    THE  REBELLION.  1 9 

cations  been  addressed  to  the  General-in-Chief  from  Fort 
Moultrie  later  than  a  letter  written  by  Major  Anderson 
almost  immediately  after  his  arrival  in  Charleston  Har 
bor,  reporting  the  then  state  of  the  work. 

G.  W.  LAY, 

Lieutenant-Colonel,  A,  D.  C. 
The  President  of  the  United  States. 

If  General  Scott  and  the  country  at  large 
were  kept  in  ignorance  of  Major  Anderson's 
wish  to  occupy  Sumter,  the  leading  rebels  were 
not.  At  the  interview  of  the  South  Carolina 
delegation  with  Mr.  Buchanan,  on  December 
9th,  pne  of  them  explained  to  him  what  they 
meant  in  their  letter  by  the  expression,  "  Rela 
tive  military  status  "  ;  they  mentioned  the  dif 
ference  between  Anderson  occupying  Forts 
Moultrie  and  Sumter.  They  stated  that  the 
latter  would  be  equivalent  to  reinforcing  the 
garrison,  and  would,  just  as  certainly  as  the 
sending  of  fresh  troops,  "  lead  to  the  result 
which  we  both  desired  to  avoid."  ( Vide  Miles 
and  Keitt's  statement,  page  127.)  They  add 
ed  :  "  When  we  rose  to  go,  the  President  said, 
in  substance,  '  After  all,  this  is  a  matter  of 
honor  among  gentlemen.  I  do  not  know  that 
any  paper  or  writing  is  necessary.  We  under 
stand  each  other. 

In  the  President's  letter  of  December  3ist, 
before  referred  to  he  does  not  deny  the  un- 


20  POLITICAL   CONSPIRACIES 

derstanding,  but  he  justifies  his  change  of 
policy  by  the  statement,  that,  in  transferring 
his  command  from  Moultrie  to  Sumter,  An 
derson  "  had  acted  on  his  own  responsibility 
and  without  authority,  unless  indeed  he  had 
tangible  evidence  of  a  design  to  proceed  to  a 
hostile  act  on  the  part  of  the  authorities  of 
South  Carolina,  which  has  not  yet  been  al 
leged.  He  adds  in  substance  that  he  would 
have  ordered  Anderson  back  if  the  South 
Carolina  people  had  not  taken  the  law  in  their 
own  hands  and  occupied  the  other  forts.  This 
was  mere  excuse  and  evasion,  and  it  must  have 
been  deeply  humiliating  to  the  President  to 
have  to  resort  to  it. 

Major  Anderson  occupied  Sumter  on  the 
night  of  December  26th,  six  days  after  the 
South  Carolina  act  of  secession,  and  the  day 
before  the  Commissioners  reached  Washington. 

The  Carolina  people  feared  the  move,  al 
though  they  thought,  that  as  Major  Anderson 
was  a  Southerner,  the  Secretary  of  War  could 
control  him.  Nevertheless  they  had  steam - 
vessels  patrolling  the  harbor  to  prevent  die 
crossing. 

The  North  was  surprised  and  delighted  at 
this  bold  move,  because  it  was  not  generally 
known  that  the  occupation  of  Sumter  had  been 


PRECEDING   THE  REBELLION.  21 

contemplated  and  advised  by  Major  Anderson. 

The  rebel  sympathizers  were  proportion 
ately  disgusted  because  they  feared  it,  but 
thought  they  had  influence  enough  to  prevent  it. 

Secretary  Floyd's  disappointment  may  be 
seen  from  this  historic  telegram. 

WAR  DEPARTMENT, 
ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S  OFFICE,  December  27,  1860. 

Major  ANDERSON,  Fort  Moultrie  : 

Intelligence  has  reached  here  this  morning  that  you 
have  abandoned  Fort  Moultrie,  spiked  your  guns,  burned 
the  carnages,  and  gone  to  Fort  Sumter.  It  is  not  be 
lieved,  because  there  is  no  order  for  any  such  movement. 
Explain  the  meaning  of  this  report. 

J.  B.  FLOYD, 

Secretary  of  War. 


CHARLESTON,  December  27,  1860. 

Hon.  J.  B.  FLOYD,  Secretary  of  War  : 

The  telegram  is  correct.  I  abandoned  Fort  Moultrie, 
because  I  was  certain  that  if  attacked  my  men  must  have 
been  sacrificed,  and  the  command  of  the  harbor  lost.  I 
spiked  the  guns  and  destroyed  the  carriages,  to  keep  the 
guns  from  being  used  against  us. 

If  attacked,  the  garrison  would  never  have  surrendered 
without  a  fight. 

ROBERT  ANDERSON, 

Major,  First  Artillery. 

It  was  this   event   that   compelled   Mr.  Bu- 


22  POLITICAL   CONSPIRACIES 

chanan  to  change  his  policy  within  ten  days 
after  Mr.  Cass  left  his  Cabinet.  He  was  placed 
under  the  coercion  of  events.  Before,  he  had 
been  dealing  with  theories  ;  from  that  time  forth 
he  found  that  he  had  to  grapple  with  facts. 

The  first  that  confronted  him  was  the  unex 
pected  and  general  outburst  of  patriotic  senti 
ment  in  the  North.  As  this  sentiment  ex 
tended  also  to  the  Northern  Democracy,  the 
President  had  to  give  his  approval  to  Major 
Anderson's  act. 

So  Mr.  Floyd  resigned  the  portfolio  of  war 
on  December  3ist,  the  day  Mr.  Buchanan 
wrote  his  reply  to  the  South  Carolina  Com 
mission.  Mr.  Cobb  had  previously  resigned. 
These  changes  forced  a  reconstruction  of  the 
Cabinet.  Judge  Black  became  Secretary  of 
State,  Governor  Dix  took  the  Treasury,  Holt 
the  War  Office,  and  Stanton  became  Attorney- 
General.  Toucey  and  Thompson  should  have 
been  dismissed.  In  this  Book  of  Revelations 
we  have  an  interesting  despatch  from  Mr. 
Thompson. 

WASHINGTON,  January ',  4,  1861. 

A.  N.  KIMBALL,  Jackson,  Miss.  : 

No  troops  have  been  sent  to  Charleston,  nor  will  be 
while  I  am  a  member  of  the  Cabinet. 

J.  THOMPSON. 


PRECEDING    THE  REBELLION.  2$ 

Mr.  Toucey's  Southern  sympathies  were  just 
as  pronounced  as  Mr.  Thompson's,  and  if  the 
President  wished  to  have  an  efficient  Cabinet  he 
should  have  gotten  rid  of  this  hostile  element. 
Black,  Stanton,  Dix,  and  Holt,  were  able, 
earnest,  and  patriotic  men,  anxious,  as  we  now 
know,  to  uphold  the  honor  of  the  government ; 
but  the  truth  is  well  known  that  Mr.  Buchanan's 
feeling  was  expressed  in  his  famous  phrase : 
11  After  me  the  deluge." 

To  understand  the  policy  of  the  administration 
and  the  acts  of  Anderson,  we  should  know  the 
orders  given  and  received  in  relation  to  the  forts 
in  Charleston  Harbor.  We  therefore  give  a 
resumt  of  them  in  order  of  date,  omitting  those 
that  are  unimportant  or  relate  merely  to  mat 
ters  of  routine. 

ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S  OFFICE, 

WASHINGTON,  November  24,  1860. 

Major  ROBERT  ANDERSON, 

First  Regiment  Artillery,  U.  S.  A.,  Commanding  Fort  Moul- 
trie,  Charleston,  S.  C.  : 

MAJOR. — The  Secretary  of  War  desires  that  you  will 
communicate,  with  the  least  delay  practicable,  the  present 
state  of  your  command,  and  every  thing  which  may  re 
late  to  the  condition  of  the  work  under  your  charge  and 
its  capabilities  of  defence,  together  with  such  views  as 
you  may  have  to  suggest  in  respect  to  the  same.  He  de 
sires  to  be  informed  whether,  in  view  of  maintaining  the 
troops  ready  for  efficient  action  and  defence,  it  might  not 


24  POLITICAL   CONSPIRACIES 

be  advisable  to  employ  reliable  persons,  not  connected 
with  the  military  service,  for  purposes  of  fatigue  and 
police. 

Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

S.  COOPER, 

Adjutant-  General. 

ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S  OFFICE, 

November  28,  1860. 
Major  ROBERT  ANDERSON, 

U.  S.  A.,  etc.,  Fort  Moultrie. 

MAJOR. — Your  letter  of  the  24th  instant  has  been  re 
ceived  and  submitted  to  the  Secretary  of  War.  It  is  now 
under  consideration,  the  result  of  which  will  be  duly  com 
municated  to  you.  In  the  meantime,  authority  has  been 
given  by  the  Engineer  Bureau  to  Captain  Foster  to  send 
to  Castle  Pinckney  the  engineer  workmen,  as  suggested 
by  you,  for  purposes  of  repairs,  etc. 

The  Secretary  desires  that  any  communications  you 
may  have  to  make  for  the  information  of  the  Department 
be  addressed  to  this  office,  or  to  the  Secretary  himself. 

Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

S.  COOPER, 

Adjutant"  General. 

ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S  OFFICE, 

December  i,  1860. 
Major  R.  ANDERSON  : 

SIR. — Your  letter  of  November  28th  has  been  received. 
The  Secretary  of  War  has  directed  Brevet  Colonel  Huger 
to  repair  to  this  city  as  soon  as  he  can  safely  leave  his 
post,  to  return  there  in  a  short  time.  He  desires  you  to 
see  Colonel  Huger  and  confer  with  him,  prior  to  his  de 
parture,  on  the  matters  which  have  been  confided  to  each 
of  you. 


PRECEDING    THE  REBELLION.  2$ 

It  is  believed,  from  information  thought  to  be  reliable, 
that  an  attack  will  not  be  made  on  your  command,  and 
the  Secretary  has  only  to  refer  to  his  conversation  with 
you,  and  to  caution  you  that,  should  his  convictions  un 
happily  prove  untrue,  your  action  must  be  such  as  to  be 
free  from  the  charge  of  initiating  a  collision.  If  attacked, 
you  are,  of  course,  expected  to  defend  the  trust  commit 
ted  to  you  to  the  best  of  your  ability. 

The  increase  of  the  force  under  your  command,  how 
ever  much  to  be  desired,  would,  the  Secretary  thinks, 
judging  from  the  recent  excitement  produced  on  account 
of  an  anticipated  increase,  as  mentioned  in  your  letter, 
but  add  to  that  excitement,  and  might  lead  to  serious  re 
sults. 

S.  COOPER. 

FORT  MOULTRIE,  S.  C.,  December •,  n,  1860. 

Memorandum  of  verbal    instructions   to   Major    ANDERSON,  First 
Artillery,  commanding  at  Fort  Moultrie,  S.  C. 

You  are  aware  of  the  great  anxiety  of  the  Secretary  of 
War  that  a  collision  of  the  troops  with  the  people  of 
this  State  shall  be  avoided,  and  of  his  studied  determina 
tion  to  pursue  a  course  with  reference  to  the  military 
force  and  forts  in  this  harbor  which  shall  guard  against 
such  a  collision.  He  has  therefore  carefully  abstained 
from  increasing  the  force  at  this  point,  or  taking  :any 
measures  which  might  add  to  the  present  excited  state  of 
the  public  mind,  or  which  would  throw  any  doubt  on  the 
confidence  he  feels  that  South  Carolina  will  not  attempt 
by  violence,  to  obtain  possession  of  the  public  works  or 
interfere  with  their  occupancy.  But  as  the  counsel  and 
acts  of  rash  and  impulsive  persons  may  possibly  disap 
point  those  expectations  of  the  government,  he  deems  it 
proper  that  you  should  be  prepared  with  instructions  to 


26  POLITICAL   CONSPIRACIES 

meet  so  unhappy  a  contingency.     He  has  therefore  di 
rected  me  verbally  to  give  you  such  instructions. 

You  are  carefully  to  avoid  every  act  which  would  need 
lessly  tend  to  provoke  aggression  ;  and  for  that  reason  you 
are  not,  without  evident  and  imminent  necessity,  to  take  up 
any  position  which  could  be  construed  into  the  assump 
tion  of  a  hostile  attitude.  But  you  are  to  hold  possession 
of  the  forts  in  this  harbor,  and  if  attacked  you  are  to  de 
fend  yourself  to  the  last  extremity.  The  smallness  of 
your  force  will  not  permit  you,  perhaps,  to  occupy  more 
one  of  the  three  forts,  but  an  attack  on  or  attempt  to  take 
possession  of  any  one  of  them  will  be  regarded  as  an  act 
of  hostility,  and  you  may  then  put  your  command  into 
either  of  them  which  you  may  deem  most  proper  to  in 
crease  its  power  of  resistance.  You  are  also  authorized 
to  take  similar  steps  whenever  you  have  tangible  evi 
dence  of  a  design  to  proceed  to  a  hostile  act. 

D.  C.  BUELL, 

Assistant  Adjutant-General. 

This  is  in  comf  ormity  to  my  instructions  to  Major  Buell. 

JOHN  B.  FLOYD, 

Secretary  of  War* 

ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S  OFFICE,      '. 

WASHINGTON,  December  14,  1860. 
Major  ANDERSON, 

First  Artillery,  Commanding  Fort  Moultrie,  Charleston,  S.  C. 

SIR  : — The  Secretary  of  War  directs  me  to  give  the 
following  answers  to  certain  questions  contained  in  your 
late  letters. 

If  the  State  authorities  demand  any  of  Captain  Foster's 
workmen  on  the  ground  of  their  being  enrolled  into  the 
service  of  the  State,  and  the  subject  is  referred  to  you, 
you  will,  after  fully  satisfying  yourself  that  the  men  are  sub- 


PRECEDING    THE  REBELLION.  2? 

ject  to  enrolment,  and  have  been  properly  enrolled  under  the 
laws  of  the  United  States,  and  of  the  State  of  South  Carolina, 
cause  them  to  be  delivered  up  or  surfer  them  to  depart. 

If  deemed  essential  to  the  more  perfect  defence  of  the 
work,  the  levelling  of  the  sand  hills  which  command  the 
fort  would  not,  under  ordinary  circumstances,  be  con 
sidered  as  initiating  a  collision.  But  the  delicate  ques 
tion  of  its  bearing  on  the  popular  mind,  in  its  present 
excited  state,  demands  the  coolest  and  wisest  judgment. 

The  fact  of  the  sand  hills  being  private  property,  and, 
as  is  understood,  having  private  residences  built  upon 
them,  decides  the  question  in  the  negative.  The  houses 
which  might  afford  dangerous  shelter  to  an  enemy,  being 
chiefly  frame,  could  be  destroyed  by  the  heavy  guns  of 
the  fort  at  any  moment,  while  the  fact  of  their  being 
levelled  in  anticipation  of  an  attack  might  betray  distrust, 
and  prematurely  bring  on  a  collision.  Their  destruction 
at  the  moment  of  being  used  as  a  cover  for  an  enemy 
would  be  more  fatal  to  the  attacking  force  than  if  swept, 
away  before  their  approach. 

An  armed  body,  approaching  for  hostile  purposes, 
would,  in  all  probability,  either  attempt  a  surprise  or  send 
a  summons  to  surrender.  In  the  former  case,  there  can 
be  no  doubt  as  to  the  course  to  be  pursued. 

In  the  latter  case,  after  refusal  to  surrender,  and  a 
warning  to  keep  off,  a  further  advance  by  the  armed 
body  would  be  initiating  a  collision  on  their  part. 

If  no  summons  be  made  by  them,  their  purpose  should 
be  demanded  at  the  same  time  that  they  are  warned  to 
keep  off,  and  their  failure  to  answer,  and  further  advance, 
would  throw  the  responsibility  upon  them. 

I  am,  etc., 

S.  COOPER, 

A  djutant-  General. 


28  POLITICAL   CONSPIRACIES 

The  peculiarly  infamous  character  of  this  let 
ter  will  be  readily  perceived. 

The  army  officers  in  the  Charleston  harbor 
are  ordered  to  submit  to  the  insolent  demand 
01  the  South  Carolina  officials,  to  allow  them  to 
enroll  their  workmen  in  their  militia,  and  also 
prohibiting  Major  Anderson  from  removing  ob 
structions  from  before  his  guns. 

His  letter  of  December  2ist  was  a  protest 
against  this  ruling.  On  the  same  day  that  the 
above  letter  was  written  by  the  direction  of  the 
Secretary  of  War,  the  following  circular  was 
sent  from  Washington. 

TO   OUR  CONSTITUENT?. 

WASHINGTON,  Dec.  14,  1860. 

The  argument  is  exhausted.  All  hope  of  relief  in  the 
Union,  through  the  agencies  of  committees,  Congres 
sional  legislation,  or  constitutional  amendments,  is  ex 
tinguished,  and  we  trust  that  the  South  will  not  be 
deceived  by  appearances  or  the  pretence  of  new  guaran 
ties.  In  our  judgment  the  Republicans  are  resolute  in 
the  purpose  to  grant  nothing  that  will  or  ought  to  satisfy 
the  South.  We  are  satisfied  the  honor,  safety,  and  inde 
pendence  of  the  Southern  people  require  the  organization 
of  a  Southern  Confederacy — a  result  to  be  obtained  only 
by  separate  State  secession  ;  that  the  primary  object  of 
each  slave  State  ought  to  be  its  speedy  ana  absolute 
separation  from  a  union  of  hostile  States. 
Signed  by : 

Pugh,  Clopton,  Moore,  Curry,  Stallworth,  Iverson,  Un- 


PRECEDING   THE  REBELLION.  29 

derwood,  Gartrell,  Jackson,  Jones,  Crawford,  Hawkins, 
Hindman,  Jefferson  Davis,  A.  G.  Brown,  Barksdale, 
Singleton,  R.  Davis,  Cragie,  Ruffin,  Slidell,  Benjamin, 
Loandrum,  Wigfall,  Hemphill,  Reagan,  Benham,  Miles, 
McQueen,  and  Ashmore. 

There  can  be  no  doubt  of  Floyd's  knowledge 
of  the  sending  of  this  secret  circular.  He  was 
in  daily  consultation  with  many  of  the  signers. 

One  of  the  signers  (Slidell)  was  his  brother- 
in-law.  He  was  busy  at  the  time  in  transferring 
arms  and  munitions  of  war  from  Northern  to 
Southern  arsenals,  and,  finally,  he  knew  that  he 
was  charged  with  being  particeps  criminis  with 
Secretary  Thompson  in  an  embezzlement  of 
$870,000  government  funds. 

December  19,  1860. 
Major  ROBERT  ANDERSON,  etc., 

Charleston,  S.  C. 

I  have  just  telegraphed  Captain  Foster  to  return  any 
arms  that  he  may  have  removed  from  Cnarleston  arsenal. 

J.  B.  FLOYD. 

WAR  DEPARTMENT, 

WASHINGTON,  December  21,  1860. 
Major  ANDERSON, 

First  Artillery,  Commanding  Fort  Moultrie,  S.  C. 

SIR  : — In  the  verbal  instructions  communicated  to  you 
by  Major  Buell,  you  are  directed  to  hold  possession  of  the 
forts  in  the  harbor  of  Charleston,  and,  if  attacked,  to  defend 


3O  POLITICAL    CONSPIRACIES 

yourself  to  the  last  extremity.  Under  these  instructions, 
you  might  infer  that  you  are  required  to  make  a  vain  and 
useless  sacrifice  of  your  own  life  and  the  lives  of  the  men 
under  your  command,  upon  a  mere  point  of  honor.  This  is 
far  from  the  President's  intentions.  You  are  to  exercise  a 
sound  military  discretion  on  this  subject. 

It  is  neither  expected  nor  desired  that  you  should  expose 
your  own  life  or  that  of  your  men  in  a  hopeless  conflict  in 
defence  of  these  forts.  If  they  are  invested  or  attacked  by 
a  force  so  superior  that  resistance  would,  in  your  judg 
ment,  be  a  useless  waste  of  life,  it  will  be  your  duty  to  yield 
to  necessity,  and  make  the  best  terms  in  your  power. 

This  will  be  the  conduct  of  an  honorable,  brave,  and 
humane  officer,  and  you  will  be  fully  justified  in  such 
action.  These  orders  are  strictly  confidential,  and  not 
to  DC  communicated  even  to  the  officers  under  your  com 
mand  without  close  necessity. 

Very  respectfully, 

JOHN  B.  FLOYD, 

Secretary  of  War. 

This  was  the  letter  delivered  by  Captain  John 
Withers,  subsequently  of  the  C.  S.  A.  It  was 
written  the  day  after  the  secession  of  South 
Carolina,  and  delivered  December  23,  1860. 
Read  between  the  lines,  it  meant  treason  pure 
and  simple.  On  receiving  it,  Major  Anderson 
determined  to  move  over  to  Sumter  without 
delay. 

The  next  was  Floyd's  telegram  of  December 
27th,  already  given. 


PRECEDING    THE  REBELLION.  3 1 

HEADQUARTERS  OF  THE  ARMY. 

NEW  YORK,  January  5,  1861. 

Major  ROBERT  ANDERSON, 

First  Artillery,  Commanding  Fort  Sumter. 

SIR  : — In  accordance  with  tne  instructions  of  the 
General-in-Chief,  I  yesterday  chartered  the  steamship 
Star  of  the  West  to  reinforce  your  small  garrison  with 
two  hundred  well-instructed  recruits  from  Fort  Columbus, 
under  First  Lieut.  C.  R.  Woods,  Ninth  Infantry,  assisted 
by  Lieuts.  W.  A.  Webb,  Fifth  Infantry,  and  C.  W.  Thomas, 
First  Infantry,  and  Asst.  Surg.  P.  G.  I.  Ten  Broeck,  Medi 
cal  Department,  all  of  whom  you  will  retain  until  further 
orders.  Besides  arms  for  ^the  men,  one  hundred  spare 
arms  and  all  the  cartridges  in  the  arsenal  on  Governor's 
Island  will  be  sent ;  likewise  three  months'  subsistence 
for  the  detachment,  and  six  months'  desiccated  and  fresh 
vegetables,  with  three  or  four  days'  fresh  beef  for  your 
entire  force.  Further  reinforcements  will  be  sent  if  neces 
sary. 

Should  a  fire,  likely  to  prove  injurious,  be  opened  upon 
any  vessel  bringing  reinforcements  or  supplies,  or  upon 
tow-boats  within  the  reach  of  your  guns,  they  may  be 
employed  to  silence  such  fire  ;  and  you  may  act  in  like 
manner  in  case  a  fire  is  opened  upon  Fort  Sumter  itself. 

The  General-in-Chief  desires  me  to  communicate  the 
fact  that  your  conduct  meets  with  the  emphatic  approba 
tion  of  the  highest  in  authority. 

You  are  warned  to  be  upon  your  guard  against  all 
telegrams,  as  false  ones  may  be  attempted  to  be  passed 
upon  you.  Measures  will  soon  be  taken  to  enable  you  to 
correspond  with  the  government  by  sea  and  Wilming 
ton,  N.  C. 

You  will  send  to  Fort  Columbus  by  the  return  of  the 


32  POLITICAL    CONSPIRACIES 

steamer  all  your  sick,  otherwise  inefficient  officers  and  en 
listed  men.     Fill  up  the  two  companies  with  the  recruits 
now  sent,  and  muster  the  residue  as  a  detachment. 
I  am,  sir,  very  respecfully, 

Your  obedient  servant,  L.  THOMAS. 

Assistant  Adiutant-General. 

Not  received  until  after  the  Star  of  the  West 
had  been  fired  on. 

WAR  DEPARTMENT,  January  10,  1861. 
Major  ROBERT  ANDERSON, 

First  Artillery ',  Commanding  at  Fort  Sumter,  S.  C. 

SIR  : — Your  dispatches  to  No,  16  inclusive  have  been 
received.  Before  the  receipt  of  that  of  3ist  December, 
announcing  that  the  government  might  reinforce  you  at 
its  leisure,  and  that  you  regarded  yourself  safe  in  your 
present  position,  some  two  hundred  and  fifty  instructed 
recruits  had  been  ordered  to  proceed  from  Governor's 
Island  to  Fort  Sumter  on  the  Star  of  the  West,  for  the 
purpose  of  strengthening  the  force  under  your  command. 
The  probability  is,  from  the  current  rumors  of  to-day, 
that  this  vessel  has  been  fired  into  by  the  South  Caro 
linians,  and  has  not  been  able  to  reach  you.  To  meet 
all  contingencies,  the  Brooklyn  has  been  dispatched,  with 
instructions  not  to  cross  the  bar  at  the  harbor  of  Charles 
ton,  but  to  afford  to  the  Star  of  the  West  and  those  OP 
board  all  the  assistance  they  may  need,  and  in  the  even, 
the  recruits  have  not  effected  a  landing  at  Fort  Sumtet 
they  will  return  to  Fort  Monroe. 

I  avail  myself  of  the  occasion  to  express  the  great  satis 
faction  of  -the  government  at  the  forbearance,  discretion, 
and  firmness  with  which  you  have  acted,  amid  the  per- 


PRECEDING   THE  REBELLION.  33 

plexing  and  difficult  circumstances  in  which  you  have 
been  placed.  You  will  continue,  as  heretofore,  to  act 
strictly  on  the  defensive  ;  to  avoid,  by  all  means  com 
patible  with  the  safety  of  your  command,  a  collision  with 
the  hostile  forces  by  which  you  are  surrounded.  But  for 
the  movement,  so  promptly  and  brilliantly  executed,  by 
which  you  transferred  your  forces  to  Fort  Sumter,  the 
probability  is  that  ere  this  the  defencelessness  of  your 
position  would  have  invited  an  attack,  which,  there  is 
reason  to  believe,  was  contemplated,  if  not  in  active  prep 
aration,  which  must  have  led  to  the  effusion  of  blood, 
that  has  been  so  happily  prevented.  The  movement, 
therefore,  was  in  every  way  admirable,  alike  for  its  hu 
manity  (and)  patriotism,  as  for  its  soldiership. 
Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

J.  HOLT, 
Secretary  of  War  ad  interim. 

WAR  DEPARTMENT,  February  23,  1861. 
Maj.  ROBERT  ANDERSON, 

First  Artillery,  Commanding  Fort  Sumter,  Charleston  Harbor,  S.  C. 

SIR  : — It  is  proper  I  should  state  distinctly  that  you 
hold  Fort  Sumter  as  you  held  Fort  Moultrie,  under  the 
verbal  orders  communicated  by  Major  Buell,  subsequently 
modified  by  instructions  addressed  to  you  from  this  De 
partment,  under  date  of  the  2ist  of  December,  1860. 

In  your  letter  to  Adjutant-General  Cooper,  of  the  i6th 
instant,  you  say  :  "  I  should  like  to  be  instructed  on  a 
question  which  may  present  itself  in  reference  to  the 
floating-battery,  viz.:  What  course  would  it  be  proper 
for  me  to  take  if,  without  a  declaration  of  war  or  a  noti 
fication  of  hostilities,  I  should  see  them  approaching  my 
fort  with  that  battery  ?  They  may  attempt  placing  it 


34  POLITICAL    CONSPIRACIES 

within  good  distance  before  a  declaration  of  hostile  in 
tention." 

It  is  not  easy  to  answer  satisfactorily  this  important 
question  at  this  distance  from  the  scene  of  action.  In 
my  letter  to  you  of  the  loth  of  January,  I  said  : 

"  You  will  continue,  as  heretofore,  to  act  strictly  on  the 
defensive,  and  to  avoid,  by  all  means  compatible  with  the 
safety  of  your  command,  a  collision  with  the  hostile  forces 
by  which  you  are  surrounded." 

The  policy  thus  indicated  must  still  govern  your  conduct. 

The  President  is  not  disposed  at  the  present  moment 
to  change  the  instructions  under  which  you  have  been 
heretofore  acting,  or  to  occupy  any  other  than  a  defensive 
position.  If,  however,  you  are  convinced  by  sufficient 
evidence  that  the  raft  of  which  you  speak  is  advancing 
for  the  purpose  of  making  an  assault  upon  the  fort,  then 
you  would  be  justified  on  the  principle  of  self-defence  in 
not  awaiting  its  actual  arrival  there,  .but  in  repelling  force 
by  force  on  its  approach.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  you 
have  reason  to  believe  that  it  is  approaching  merely  to 
take  up  a  position  at  a  good  distance,  should  the  pending 
question  be  not  amicably  settled,  then,  unless  your  safety 
is  so  clearly  endangered  as  to  render  resistance  an  act  of 
necessary  self-defence  and  protection,  you  will  act  with 
that  forbearance  which  has  distinguished  you  heretofore 
in  permitting  the  South  Carolinians  to  strengthen  Fort 
Moultrie  and  erect  new  batteries  for  the  defence  of  the 
harbor.  This  will  be  but  a  redemption  of  the  implied 
pledge  contained  in  my  letter  on  behalf  of  the  President 
to  Colonel  Hayne,  in  which,  when  speaking  of  Fort  Sum- 
ter,  it  is  said  : 

"  The  attitude  of  that  garrison,  as  has  been  often  de 
clared,  is  neither  menacing,  nor  defiant,  nor  unfriendly. 
It  is  acting  under  orders  to  stand  strictly  on  the  defensive, 


PRECEDING    THE  REBELLION.  35 

and  the  government  and  people  of  South  Carolina  must 
know  that  they  can  never  receive  aught  but  shelter  from 
its  guns,  unless,  in  the  absence  of  all  provocation,  they 
should  assault  it  and  seek  its  destruction." 

A  dispatch  received  in  this  city  a  few  days  since  from 
Governor  Pickens,  connected  with  the  declaration  on  the 
part  of  those  convened  at  Montgomery,  claiming  to  act 
on  behalf  of  South  Carolina  as  well  as  the  other  seceded 
States,  that  the  question  of  the  possession  of  the  forts  and 
other  public  property  therein  had  been  taken  from  the 
decision  of  the  individual  States,  and  would  probably  be 
preceded  in  its  settlement  by  negotiation  with  the  govern 
ment  of  the  United  States,  has  impressed  the  President 
with  a  belief  that  there  will  be  no  immediate  attack  on 
Fort  Sumter,  and  the  hope  is  indulged  that  wise  and 
patriotic  counsels  may  prevail  and  prevent  it  altogether. 

The  labors  of  the  Peace  Congress  have  not  yet  closed, 
and  the  presence  of  that  body  here  adds  another  to  the 
powerful  motives  already  existing  for  the  adoption  of 
every  measure,  except  in  necessary  self-defence,  for  avoid 
ing  a  collision  with  the  forces  that  surround  you. 
Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

J.  HOLT. 

This  brings  the  orders  and  correspondence 
down  to  the  close  of  the  Buchanan  administra 
tion.  In  itself  it  would  be  incomprehensible 
either  to  the  military  or  political  student.  The 
clue  to  the  mystery  is  to  be  found  in  the  cor 
respondence  between  the  Executive  and  the 
Hon.  J.  W.  Hayne,  the  Attorney-General  of 
South  Carolina. 


36  POLITICAL   CONSPIRACIES 

While  Mr.  Crittenden  was  devising  com 
promises  and  Mr.  Taylor  and  his  confreres 
were  getting  up  peace  conventions,  Mr.  Hayne 
came  to  Washington  to  serve,  as  it  were,  a 
legal  process  on  the  government.  He  ten 
dered  payment  on  the  part  of  his  State  for  all 
government  property  in  the  borders  of  South 
Carolina,  and  in  case  the  United  States  gov 
ernment  did  not  see  fit  to  accept  his  offer,  he 
gave  notice,  on  the  part  of  his  free  and  sover 
eign  State,  of  its  intention  to  act  by  forcible 
entry  and  detainer.  Singularly  enough,  the 
President  answered  this  piece  of  political  im 
pertinence  by  a  long  chop-logic  letter  through 
Mr.  Holt,  his  Secretary  of  War. 

Driven  from  his  non-intervention  standpoint 
by  the  outburst  of  patriotic  feeling  that  followed 
the  occupation  of  Sumter,  Mr.  Buchanan  had 
to  assume  the  position,  in  a  message  he  sent  to 
Congress  on  the  8th  of  January,  1861,  that  he 
was  bound  to  hold  the  forts  as  public  prop 
erty. 

Seeing  that  he  claimed  for  his  government 
no  right  of  sovereignty,  but  only  a  property 
right,  founded  on  purchase  and  relinquish- 
ment,  South  Carolina  adroitly  came  forward 
with  her  claim  of  eminent  domain  and  national 
sovereignty. 


s 

PRECEDING    THE  REBELLION.  37 

No  one  cares  for  this  controversy  now,  but 
it  throws  a  strong  light  on  the  character  of  the 
Old  Public  Functionary,  and  explains  many  ap 
parent  inconsistencies. 

Up  to  the  time  of  his  election  to  the  Presi 
dency,  Mr.  Buchanan  had  been  very  generally 
considered  a  man  of  ability  his  speeches  and 
State  papers  were  creditable,  if  not  brilliant; 
yet  as  an  executive  officer  in  a  great  crisis  he 
was  an  evident  failure.  It  seems  to  me  that  his 
failure  resulted  from  a  misunderstanding  of  the 
philosophy  of  history,  which  caused  him  to 
misapprehend  the  first  principles  of  national 
growth.  He  seemed  to  think  that  the  Contract 
Sociale  was  something  more  than  an  illustrative 
theory  ;  that  nations  could  be  formed  by  agree 
ment,  held  together  by  paper  constitutions  or 
dissolved  by  mutual  consent.  He  seemed  to 
think  that  the  constitution  made  the  Ameri 
can  Nation  and  was  not  rather  the  expression 
of  the  lex  non  scripta  of  our  national  life.  He 
did  not  seem  to  understand  the  principle  of  the 
unification  of  races,  and  that,  with  us  at  least 
the  cohesive  principle  was  as  strong  as  reason 
habit,  pride,  self-interest,  and  love  of  liberty 
could  make  it.  The  deluge  overtook  him  and 
in  its  waves  his  political  reputation  perished. 

If  the  publication  of  the   Rebellion  records 


38  POLITICAL    CONSPIRACIES 

give  us  no  positively  new  information  in  rela 
tion  to  the  two  expeditions  sent  to  the  relief 
of  Sumter,  it  will  at  least  settle  some  disputed 
points. 

Judge  Black  has  recently  asserted  that  Lieu- 
tenant-General  Scott  was  responsible  for  the 
failure  of  these  expeditions.  Yet  it  appears 
from  the  record  that  the  first  attempt,  at  least, 
was  suggested  by  the  Lieutenant-General.  On 
December  28,  1860,  Scott  wrote  to  the  Sec 
retary  of  War,  requesting  :  first,  that  Sumter 
should  not  be  given  up  ;  second,  that  it  be  re 
inforced  and  provisioned  ;  and,  third,  that  two 
armed  vessels  should  be  sent  to  support  the 
fort. 

As  Mr.  Floyd  resigned  the  next  day,  Gen 
eral  Scott  wrote  to  the  President  direct  to  the 
same  effect.  On  the  3ist  of  December  he  sent 
an  order  to  Colonel  Dimick,  at  Fort  Monroe,  to 
send  four  companies  to  Sumter  by  the  sloop-of- 
war  Brooklyn. 

The  President  was  subsequently  persuaded  to 
substitute  a  merchant  steamer,  the  Star  of  the 
West,  for  the  Brooklyn. 

Unfortunately  the  garrison  of  Sumter  was 
not  notified  of  its  coming,  and  was  taken  com 
pletely  by  surprise  when  the  Morris  Island  bat 
teries  opened  fire.  Before  they  got  ready  to 


PRECEDING    THE  REBELLION.  39 

fight  the  vessel  had  turned  back.  This  was  on 
January  Qth.  When  the  fort  was  occupied 
fourteen  days  before,  it  must  be  remembered 
that  it  was  in  the  hands  of  Captain  Foster's 
workmen,  and  in  a  very  unfinished  state.  It 
was  literally  filled  with  construction  material 
and  debris.  The  parade  was  covered  with  their 
frame  workshops.  The  gorge  was  open  ;  the 
embrasures  boarded  up  loosely  with  inch  plank  ; 
only  the  lighter  guns  were  mounted  ;  the  heavy 
guns  were  not  mounted  before  the  fifteenth,  as 
stated  by  General  Doubleday  in  his  personal 
reminiscences  of  Moultrie  and  Sumter.  The 
distance  from  Sumter  to  the  Star  of  the  West 
battery  was  2,800  yards.  At  that  distance  any 
of  the  guns  then  mounted  at  Sumter  would  have 
been  ineffective.  The  South  Carolina  authori 
ties  were  notified  of  the  departure  and  mission 
of  the  Star  of  the  West  by  Mr.  Thompson,  the 
Secretary  of  the  Interior,  who  learned  the  pur 
pose  of  the  President  at  a  Cabinet  meeting,  the 
proceedings  of  which  were  declared  confidential. 
Captain  Ward,  of  the  navy,  who  commanded 
the  receiving  ship  North  Carolina  in  New  York 
harbor,  in  the  winter  of  1861,  proposed  during 
the  month  of  February  to  relieve  fort  Sumter 
by  using  four  or  more  small  coast  survey  steam 
ers.  Mr.  Cameron,  in  the  synopsis  of  the  vari- 


4O  POLITICAL    CONSPIRACIES 

ous  plans  for  the  relief  of  Sumter,  which  he 
laid  before  President  Lincoln,  on  March  i5, 
1 86 1,  says  that  this  plan  met  with  General 
Scott's  concurrence,  but  that  the  late  President 
would  not  allow  the  attempt  to  be  made  ("  Re 
bellion  Records,"  vol.  i,  p.  197).  Subsequently 
it  is  stated  that  Captain  Ward  afterward  aban 
doned  his  plan,  after  consultation  with  General 
Scott.  Yet  on  the  2Oth  of  February,  the  Lieu- 
tenant-General  wrote  to  Colonel  H.  L.  Scott, 
his  A.  D.  C.,  in  New  York  City,  directing  him 
to  prepare  the  expedition  as  soon  as  Captain 
Ward  could  get  his  squadron  ready.  Judge 
Black,  then  Secretary  of  State,  is  authority  for 
the  statement  that  President  Buchanan  with 
drew  his  assent  to  Captain  Ward's  expedition 
upon  General  Scott's  advice. 

On  the  1 6th  of  January,  1 86 1,  Judge  Black 
addressed  a  letter  to  the  Lieut-General,  urging 
a  renewed  attempt  to  reinforce  Major  Ander 
son.  General  Scott  never  answered  that  letter, 
and  the  probabilities  are  that  he  had  even  then 
formed  the  opinion  that  any  further  attempt  to 
relieve  Sumter  would  be  unadvisable.  It  is 
very  improbable  that  the  Star  of  the  West  was 
substituted  for  the  Brooklyn  upon  his  advice,  in 
view  of  his  earnest  recommendation,  already 
quoted,  made  upon  December  28,  1860,  that 


PRECEDING    THE  REBELLION.  41 

two  armed  vessels  be  sent  to  the  support  of 
Fort  Sumter. 

But  there  is,  I  think,  no  doubt  that  he  was 
opposed  to  all  attempts  to  relieve  the  garrison 
of  Sumter  by  sea. 

General  Scott,  in  answer  to  a  question  ad 
dressed  to  him  by  Mr.  Lincoln,  on  the  1 2th  of 
April,  replied. 

"  I  should  need  a  fleet  of  war  vessels  and  trans 
ports  which,  in  the  scattered  disposition  of  the 
navy  (as  understood),  could  not  be  collected  in 
less  than  four  months  :  5,ooo  additional  regular 
troops,  and  20,000  volunteers  ;  that  is,  a  force 
sufficient  to  take  all  the  batteries,  both  in  the 
harbor  (including  Fort  Moultrie)  as  well  as  in 
the  approach  or  outer  bay.  To  raise,  organize, 
and  discipline  such  an  army  (not  to  speak  of 
necessary  legislation  by  Congress,  not  now  in 
session)  would  require  from  six  to  eight  months. 
As  a  practical  military  question  the  time  for  suc 
coring  Fort  Sumter  with  any  means  at  hand 
had  passed  away  nearly  a  month  ago.  Since 
then  a  surrender  under  assault  or  from  starva 
tion  has  been  merely  a  question  of  time." 

What  is  still  more  conclusive  is  the  evidence 
contained  in  the  "  Rebellion  Records,"  of  the  truth 
of  the  assertions  of  Mr.  Welles  and  Mr.  Mont 
gomery  Blair :  that  Mr.  William  H.  Seward 


42  POLITICAL    CONSPIRACIES 

and  Lieut. -General  Scott  obtained  the  order 
from  President  Lincoln  which  detached  the 
Pvwhatan  from  Mr.  Fox's  relief  expedition  to 
Sumter.  First  we  have  the  letter  of  Mr.  Lin 
coln  (p.  406,  "  Rebellion  Records  ")  assuming  the 
responsibility  for  relieving  Captain  Mercer  and 
of  placing  Lieutenant  D.  D.  Porter  in  command 
of  the  Pawhatan.  Next  we  have  this  letter  of  Mr. 
Secretary  Welles'  "  young  captain  named  Meigs." 

QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL'S  OFFICE, 

WASHINGTON,  D.  C.,  February  27,  1865. 

Bvt.  Brig.  Gen.  E.  D.  TOWNSEND, 

Assistant  Adjutant-General,  War  Department. 

MY  DEAR  GENERAL: — The  Navy  Department  has  no 
copy  of  the  instructions  to  D.  D.  Porter  and  other  naval 
officers  under  which  they  co-operated  with  the  expedition 
of  April  1 86 1,  to  reinforce  Fort  Pickens. 

The  President  has  none,  and  they  have  applied  to  me. 
My  copies,  I  think,  I  placed  in  Hartsuff's  hands.  He 
was  adjutant  of  the  expedition. 

Please  forward  the  enclosed  note  to  him,  and  if  you 
have  copies,  let  me  have,  for  the  Navy  Department,  a 
copy  of  the  President's  order  to  Porter,  and  to  other 
naval  officers.  Also  of  the  order  to  Colonel  Brown,  which 
required  all  naval  officers  to  aid  him. 

General  Scott  knew  of  the  expedition  and  its  orders  ; 
and  you  were  acting  confidentially  with  him   and   may 
have  had  custody  of  those  orders,  which  were  kept  secret 
even  from  the  Secretaries  of  War  and  Navy,  I  believe. 
Yours  truly, 

M.  C.  MEIGS, 

Quartermaster-General,  Brevet  Major-General. 


PRECEDING    THE  REBELLION.  43 

It  is  hard  to  understand  why  Gen.  Scott 
sanctioned  the  transfer  of  the  Powhatan  from 
the  Sumter  to  the  Pickens  expedition  without 
the  knowledge  of  either  the  Secretary  of  War 
or  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy.  He  was  a 
great  soldier,  a  cultivated  gentleman,  the  soul 
of  honor,  and  a  true  patriot.  Yet  the  fact 
seems  indisputable.  It  may  be  that  he  knew 
he  could  not  save  Fort  Sumter,  and  hoped  to 
save  Fort  Pickens  at  the  sacrifice  of  the  other. 
A  general  may  give  up  an  outpost,  like  a 
chess-player  offering  a  gambit  pawn,  but,  as 
before  remarked,  the  mystery  in  this  case  is 
that  he  acted  without  the  knowledge  of  the 
heads  of  departments.  The  following  letter 
from  Gen.  Meigs  fully  explains  his  connection 
with  the  Pickens  expedition. 

WASHINGTON,  Oct.  31,  1881. 

Lt.  Col.  THOMAS  M.  ANDERSON, 

9//fc  Infantry,  Fort  McKinney,  Wyo.  Ter. 

MY  DEAR  SIR  : — I  have  not  time  to  reply  fully  to  your 
questions  about  Pickens.  Something  on  the  subject 
from  me  you  will  find  in  Scott's  two  volumes  of  the 
"Records  of  the  Rebellion  "  thus  far  published.' 

I  may  say  that  Mr.  Seward  took  me  to  see  President 
Lincoln,  saying  that  he  understood  that  some  officers  of 
higher  rank  than  myself  were  indisposed  to  advise  active 
measures  to  relieve  posts  in  danger.  That  he  had  noth 
ing  to  say  as  to  how  I  should  speak  to  Mr.  Lincoln  ;  he 


44  POLITICAL    CONSPIRACIES 

wished  me  to  answer  any  questions  put  to  me  according 
to  my  best  belief  and  knowledge. 

Mr.  Lincoln  asked  whether  Sumter  could  be  relieved. 
I  said  that  was  a  matter  for  the  navy.  It  must  be  done 
by  ships.  That  there  might  be  difference  of  opinion  on 
such  a  subject,  but  that  I  was  sure  I  could  find  him 
young  naval  officers  then  in  Washington,  who  would 
gladly,  if  authorized,  undertake  to  attempt  it. 

He  then  dropped  the  subject,  and  I  heard  no  more  of 
Sumter  till  at  Santa  Rosa  Island  I  saw  extracts  from 
newspapers,  mutilated  slips  sent  to  Fort  Pickens  by 
General  Bragg,  announcing  its  surrender  as  a  military 
necessity. 

The  subject  of  Pickens  was  taken  up.  I  had  passed  it 
going  out  of  Pensacola  Harbor  in  November,  1860,  and 
was  familiar  with  the  maps  and  plans  of  the  position  in 
the  engineer  office. 

Could  Fort  Pickens  be  reinforced  ?  Yes,  if  done  in 
time.  The  embrasures  are  a  few  feet  only  above  the 
bottom  of  the  ditch,  and  a  coup-de-main  with  loss  of  a 
few  men,  could,  I  believed,  carry  it  against  the  very  in 
sufficient  garrison  under  Slemmer. 

How  can  it  be  done  ?  Send  a  ship  of  war  immediately 
under  sealed  orders  to  enter  the  harbor  and  prevent  boat 
expeditions  crossing  from  Pensacola  to  Santa  Rosa 
Island.  For  this  purpose  I  recommended,  for  reasons 
which  I  stated  fully,  and  which  were  derived  from  his 
history,  Lieut.  David  Porter,  now  Admiral  Porter.  I 
also  said  Providence  supplies  the  man  and  the  means. 
Porter  I  had  seen  within  a  day  or  so  in  Washington,  and 
I  learned  by  the  newspapers  that  the  Powhatan  had  just 
returned  from  a  foreign  cruise.  If  she  could  cross  the 
Atlantic  she  could  at  once  go  to  Pickens. 

Send  as    soon   as  possible  troops  and   supplies  in   a 


PRECEDING    THE  REBELLION.  45 

transport  steamer  to  land  and  reinforce  the  garrison  of 
Pickens. 

The  Powhatan  will  prevent  the  boat  expedition,  which, 
I  said,  might  be  at  that  moment  (it  was  after  dark)  under 
weigh  ;  if  she  got  in,  the  others  would  relieve  the  for 
tress.  The  island  is  fitted  with  longitudinal  sand  ridges, 
which  would  protect  troops  and  stores  landed  on  the 
beach  east  of  the  fort  and  out  of  the  range  of  the  rebel 
batteries  in  their  approach  to  Pickens. 

The  President  said  he  would  perhaps  send  for  me 
again,  I  urged  that  the  strictest  secrecy  was  indispen 
sable,  as  it  was  known  that  telegrams  had  communicated 
information  to  the  Southern  leaders. 

I  had  no  suspicion  of  anybody  in  high  station,  but  the 
ordinary  business  of  the  executive  departments  brings 
every  paper  under  the  eye  of  more  than  one  person.  A 
secretary  cannot  take  care  of  the  papers  he  signs  or  acts 
upon.  They  are  too  many,  and  clerks  and  others  are 
necessary  to  perform  the  mere  physical  labor  of  caring 
for  records  and  dispatching  and  filing  official  papers.  I 
believe  that  it  was  suggested  afterward  by  Porter  that 
the  telegraph  wires  around  Washington  ought  all  to  be 
cut. 

The  President  sent  for  me  again  on  a  Saturday  even 
ing  or  a  Sunday  morning,  and  directed  that  Colonel 
Keyes,  Military  Secretary  to  General  Scott,  and  myself 
should  draw  up  a  project  for  the  relief  of  Pickens,  sub 
mit  it  to  General  Scott,  and  do  this  by,  I  think,  2  p.  M. 
of  Sunday. 

We  went  to  the  engineer  office,  to  which,  though  closed, 
I  had  access,  got  out  the  plans  of  Santa  Rosa  and  of 
Pensacola  Harbor,  prepared  our  project,  took  it  to  Gen 
eral  Scott,  who,  after  discussion,  approved  it  as  it  stood, 
except  the  provision  authorizing  the  commander  of  the 


46  POLITICAL    CONSPIRACIES 

expedition  to  declare  martial  law  on  the  Gulf  Coast, 
especially  at  Key  West.  This  he  thought  illegal.  Mr. 
Seward  came  in  ;  we  discussed  it ;  I  urged  its  legality 
and  necessity.  The  Constitution  was  examined  again, 
and  Mr.  Seward  said  that  was  authority  enough  for  him, 
and  we  should  have  power  to  declare  martial  law. 

He  said  he  wished  me  to  go  with  the  expedition,  and 
he  suggested  that  I  should  be  given  rank  to  command  it. 
General  Scott  told  him  that  all  the  power  of  the  Presi 
dent  then  could  not  make  a  captain  a  major  even,  which 
I  knew  well  enough.  I  told  Mr.  Seward  that  I  was  in 
this  contest  and  ready  to  go  with  my  present  rank  or 
with  none  at  all. 

General  Scott  was  earnest  and  fully  approved.  He 
objected  to  our  proposition  to  take  a  mounted  battery  of 
artillery  then  in  Washington,  as  taking  away  all  his 
strength  in  this  city.  I  said  :  "  General,  if  this  comes  to 
war  you  will  want  not  a  battery  of  artillery  here,  but  a 
large  force,  and  the  regular  army  will  be  nothing  ;  it  will 
be  the  yeomanry  of  the  country  that  will  come  to  defend 
Washington."  He  then  consented. 

The  force  taken  has  been  published.  Porter  had 
orders,  drawn  up  by  myself  and  Keyes,  signed  by  the 
President's  own  hand,  to  take  the  Powhatan.  Telegram 
to  New  York  Navy  Yard,  and  letter  to  her  then  com 
mander  from  the  President,  ordered  her  to  be  dispatched 
under  Porter's  command  at  the  earliest  possible  moment 
and  under  sealed  orders,  her  destination  unknown  to  her 
then  commander  or  crew,  or  to  the  officers  at  the  navy 
yard. 

Major  Harvey  Brown  was  ordered  to  command  the 
troops  which  were  gathered  at  New  York  and  dispatched 
in  the  steamer  Atlantic,  which  I  accompanied. 

The  rest  is  history. 


PRECEDING    THE  REBELLION.  4? 

She  was  followed  by  the  Illinois,  with  other  troops. 

I  heard  no  one  hint  any  doubt  of  the  good  faith  of  any 
executive  officer  or  of  General  Scott.  He  entered 
heartily  into  the  project,  and  was  kind  and  cordial  to 
the  authors.  I  think  he  recognized  the  importance  of 
absolute  secrecy  for  protection  against  information  which 
might  leak  out  if  the  project  was  known  to  any  but  those 
who  were  engaged  in  it. 

I  think  that  Mr.  Lincoln,  Mr.  Seward,  General  Scott, 
Harvey  Brown,  after  he  received  his  orders,  Keyes,  Lieut. 
David  Porter,  and  myself  were  the  only  persons  who 
knew  the  destination  of  the  troops,  of  the  Powhatan,  or 
of  the  Atlantic,  until  the  steamers  Powhatan  and  Atlantic 
reached  Santa  Rosa. 

The  Powhatan  was  delayed  in  New  York,  and  sailed 
only  an  hour  or  two  before  the  Altantic,  and  the  latter, 
being  the  faster  vessel,  arrived  at  least  a  day  before  the 
Pou>tiatan,  and  the  troops  were  in  Pickens  before  the 
Powhatan  hove  in  sight.  Then,  at  request  of  Harvey 
Brown,  I  met  the  Powhatan  with  difficulty,  and  only  by 
laying  the  ship  I  was  on  athwart  her  bows,  stopped  her 
and  explained  to  Porter  that  the  fort  being  reinforced  it 
would  be  a  crime  to  expose  his  ship  and  crew  to  injury 
by  attempting  to  enter  the  harbor. 

The  secrecy  was  to  prevent  leaks  from  whatever  source, 
and  not  from  doubt  of  the  loyalty  and  fidelity  of  any 
officer  of  high  position. 

If  you  wish  to  keep  any  project  secret,  tell  it  to 
nobody,  and  to  those  to  be  engaged  in  it  tell  only  so 
much  as  will  direct  their  movements  till  it  is  necessary  to 
tell  more. 

All  the  orders  for  the  expedition  were  drawn  up  by 
Keyes  and  myself,  and  they  were  signed  in  effect  exactly 
as  we  advised. 


48  POLITICAL    CONSPIRACIES 

I  knew  of  no  attempt  to  relieve  Sumter.  It  appeared 
afterward  that  Naval  Secretary  Welles  destined  the 
Powhatan  for  Sumter.  He  had  not,  I  believe,  perfected 
his  plan  at  the  time  I  suggested  her  use  for  Pickens,  for 
when  we  got  to  New  York,  instead  of  finding  her  ready 
to  sail,  we  found  her  crew  detached  and  the  ship  partially, 
at  least,  dismantled,  so  that  it  took  some  days  of  active, 
earnest  work  to  get  a  crew  on  board  and  make  her  ready 
to  sail. 

When  I  first  spoke  with  the  President  on  her  use,  I 
had  just  seen  in  the  day's  papers  her  arrival  in  New  York 
reported,  and  I  supposed  she  could  start  as  soon  as 
ordered. 

I  do  not  believe  that  the  Powhatan  was  changed  from 
the  Sumter  to  the  Pickens  expedition.  I  believe  that 
the  first  order  was  Mr.  Lincoln's,  giving  her  to  Porter 
and  Pickens,  and  that  in  ignorance  of  this  order,  she  was 
destined  by  the  Navy  Department  to  Sumter.  But  Mr. 
Lincoln's  sign-manual  to  Porter's  orders  to  take  com 
mand,  and  to  Captain  Mercer's  orders  to  resign 'com 
mand,  overruled  the  orders  of  the  Secretary  of  the 
Navy,  which,  I  believe,  were  received  while  Porter  and 
Foote,  who  was  then  in  command  of  the  Brooklyn  Navy 
Yard,  were  straining  every  nerve  to  refit  her  for  a  desti 
nation  unknown  to  all  navy  officers  and  the  Navy  De 
partment,  except  Porter. 

He  called  me  to  Brooklyn,  finding  the  case  blocked, 
and  I  showed  Captains  Mercer  and  Foote  the  sign- 
manual  of  the  President ;  told  them  that  the  Secretary  of 
the  Navy  and  the  Secretary  of  War  knew  nothing  of  this, 
and  asked  which  they  would  obey,  the  President  or  his 
Secretary.  They  concluded  to  obey  the  President's 
order  exhibited  to  them. 

The  President,  therefore,  if  he  changed  at  all  the  des- 


PRECEDING    THE  REBELLION.  49 

tination  of  the  Powhatan,  did  it  after  he  had  signed 
orders  sending  her  to  Fickens. 

I  had  no  occasion  to  discuss  the  question  of  saving  or 
sacrificing  Sumter  as  against  Pickens.  After  advising 
the  President  that  I  could  find  him  naval  officers  who 
would  be  glad  to  attempt  the  relief  of  Sumter,  that  for 
tress  was  not  again  mentioned  in  my  presence. 

I  had  no  apprehension  from,  and  I  heard  none  ex 
pressed  of,  spies  in  high  places.  My  object  was  to  avoid 
leakage,  which  is  sure  to  occur  in  a  vessel  of  too  many 
joints  or  parts,  and  I  urged  that  nobody  know  what  we 
intended  to  do,  except  those  who  directed  and  controlled, 
and  the  orders  to  the  Atlantic  were  to  sail  in  a  certain 
direction  from  New  York,  and  at  a  certain  distance  open 
an  order  which  directed  only  the  next  stage  of  the 
voyage,  etc.,  etc. 

General  Scott's  feelings  and  inclinations  have  been 
much  discussed.  All  I  saw  of  him  during  his  life  was 
hearty,  true  loyalty,  and  fidelity  to  his  oath  as  an  officer 
of  the  army  of  the  United  States. 

I  believe  I  have  answered,  as  fully  as  I  can  without 
searching  documents  for  dates,  all  vour  questions. 

I  remain,  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 
M.  C.  MEIGS, 

Quartermaster-General,  Bvt.  Major-General,   U.   S.  A. 

There  is  also  a  letter  from  General  Meigs  to 
Mr.  Seward,  too  long  to  quote,  which  contains 
this  felicitation,  of  the  success  of  their  conspir 
acy  by  which  the  naval  expedition  to  Sumter 
was  deliberately  ruined  : 


5O  POLITICAL    CONSPIRACIES 

"  Your  dispatch  arrived  as  I  was  on  my  way 
to  the  Atlantic,  just  before  the  hour  at  which 
she  was  to  sail,  and  two  or  three  hours  after 
that  appointed  for  the  Powhatan.  When  the 
arrow  has  sped  from  the  bow  it  may  glance  aside, 
but  who  shall  reclaim  it  before  its  flight  is  fin 
ished?  "  (P.  369.) 

This  letter  was  written  at  sea,  yet  Captain 
Meigs  evidently  feared  that  either  the  Sec 
retary  of  War  or  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy 
might  get  intelligence  of  the  orders  sent  to  the 
Powhatan  without  their  knowledge,  and  still 
reclaim  her  even  in  her  flight. 

In  the  long  letter  of  instructions  from  Gen 
eral  Scott  to  Colonel  Harvey  Brown,  com 
manding  the  Pickens  expedition,  approved 
by  the  President,  and  which  was  supple 
mented  by  an  endorsement  by  Mr.  Lincoln, 
directing  all  officers  of  the  army  and  navy 
to  aid  the  expedition,^  there  is  no  word  to 
warn  the  President  that  the  Powhatan  was  to 
be  used  for  the  purpose  of  the  Pickens  expe 
dition. 

As  the  fbwkatan  had  on  board  all  the  troops 
intended  to  reinforce  Sumter,  and  all  the 
barges  provided  for  the  landing  of  both  soldiers 
and  supplies,  when  she  was  detached,  of  course 
the  expedition  failed. 


PRECEDING    THE  REBELLION.  $1 

It  is  only  fair  to  say  that  Pickens  was  saved 
if  Sumter  was  sacrificed.1 

The  most  singular  fact  in  this  connection  is 
that  both  General  Scott  and  General  Totten 
(chief  of  engineers)  had  been  asserting  that 
neither  Sumter  nor  Pickens  could  be  saved. 

An  account  of  the  siege  and  fall  of  Fort 
Sumter  may  be  very  briefly  given.  It  is  a 
matter  of  very  little  military  importance,  its 
significance  being  altogether  political.  Only 
such  important  points  in  the  oft-repeated  story 
will  be  referred  to,  as  may  be  necessary  for  a 
better  understanding  of  the  great  drama  of 
Rebellion,  of  which  it  was  the  prelude. 

Major  Anderson  had  warned  his  government 
that  the  people  of  South  Carolina  intended  to 
take  forcible  possession  of  the  forts  in  Charles 
ton  Harbor  as  soon  as  the  State  convention 
adopted  the  ordinance  of  secession.  He  had 

1  The  opinions  of  the  army  and  navy  officers  laid  before  President 
Lincoln,  as  given  in  the  "  Rebellion  Record,"  vol.  i,  p.  196,  et  se- 
qTtentia,  may  be  summarized  as  follows  : 

Gen.  Scott  and  Gen.  Totten  did  not  think  that  Fort  Sumter  could 
be  relieved  with  the  means  they  had  or  were  likely  to  get. 

Gen.  Anderson  thought  such  an  enterprise  would  require  20,000 
men.  Gen.  Seymour,  his  second  in  command,  thought  the  attempt 
would  result  in  a  siege  as  formidable  and  protracted  as  that  of  Se- 
bastopol. 

Lieut.  Synder ,  Eng.  Corp. :  four  thousand  men  and  four  vessels  of  war. 

Lieut.  R.  K.  Mead,  Eng.  Corp.:  5,000  men,  supported  by  gun-boats. 

Dr.  S.  W.  Crawford  (afterward  General)  :  4,000  men,  supported  by 
the  navy. 

Lieut,  (afterward  General)  J.  C.  Davis  :  3,000  men  and  six  war 
vessels. 


52  POLITICAL    CONSPIRACIES. 

reason  to  believe  this  from  the  open  declara 
tion  of  their  highest  State  officials,  and  their 
military  preparations  all  over  those  States.  He 
regarded  the  proclamation  of  the  ordinance  of 
secession  on  December  2Oth,  as  an  open  act  of 
rebellion,  and,  six  days  after,  moved  to  the  safer 
position  on  the  island  of  Sumter.  To  give  the 
fullest  possible  confirmation  to  his  belief,  the 
South  Carolina  militia  took  possession  of  Fort 
Moultrie  and  Castle  Pinckney  the  next  day. 
On  the  30th  they  seized  the  United  States 
arsenal  in  Charleston,  entering  it  by  escalade. 
In  point  of  fact  they  had  had  a  guard  over  it  for 
two  weeks,  under  the  poor  pretext,  before  re 
ferred  to,  that  their  slaves  might  take  it.  They 
claimed  that  Major  Anderson's  change  of  base 
was  an  act  of  war.  Yet  they  had  been  pre 
paring  for  war  and  levying  war  for  months. 

They  began  erecting  batteries  about  Sumter 
within    twenty-four   hours    of    its    occupation. 

Lieut.  Theodore  Talbot,  ist  Art.:  3,000  men  and  navy. 

Capt.   (afterward  Gen.)  A.  Doubleday  :   10,000  men  and  navy. 

Captain  (afterward  Gen.)  Foster  :  6,000  regulars,  or  20,000  volun 
teers  to  take  them  ;  10,000  regulars  or  30,000  volunteers  to  hold 
them. 

Commodore  Stringham  agreed  with  Foster.  As  Foster  had  once 
belonged  to  the  Coast  Survey,  he  probably  knew  more  about  the 
question  than  all  the  rest  put  together. 

Gen  Geo.  B.  McClellan,  then  in  Cincinnati,  told  the  writer,  the 
day  the  rebel  guns  opened  on  Sumter,  that  that  fort  was  ut 
terly  indefensible,  and  would  not  hold  out  forty-eight  hours.  This 
was  somewhat  surprising,  as  an  officer  of  engineers,  now  a  general  in 
the  army,  had,  on  the  evening  before,  explained  to  a  set  of  gratified 
listeners,  that  Fort  Sumter  was  impregnable. 


PRECEDING   THE   REBELLION.  53 

They  fired  into  the  Star  of  the  West  on  January 
9,  1 86 1.  On  the  nth  the  governor  of  South 
Carolina  demanded  the  surrender  of  the  fort. 
On  the  first  of  March  the  Confederate  govern 
ment  assumed  control  of  the  forces  in  Charles 
ton  Harbor.  General  Beauregard  assumed 
command  on  the  3d,  and  on  the  same  day  the 
schooner  Rhoda  H.  Shannon  was  fired  on  by 
the  Confederate  batteries,  this  being  their  first 
overt  act  of  war. 

Major  Anderson  never  feared  the  South 
Carolina  militia ;  as  long  as  they  were  his  only 
opponents  he  assured  his  government  that  he 
was  perfectly  secure  in  his  position. 

But  when  the  Confederate  authorities  took 
charge  of  the  siege  operations  against  him, 
they  soon  made  such  a  show  of  strength  and 
energy  that  he  discovered  his  mistake,  and 
frankly  avowed  it.  As  soon  as  he  could  do  so, 
he  informed  the  War  Department,  not  only  of 
the  difficulty  of  holding  the  fort,  but  of  the 
serious  obstacles  that  would  have  to  be  over 
come  in  effecting  its  relief. 

It  was  on  the  i2th  of  March,  1861,  that  the 
so-called  Confederate  Commissioners  arrived  in 
Washington,  and  asked  permission  to  call  on 
the  President,  and  present  their  credentials  as 
the  embassadors  of  a  foreign  power.  This  was 


54  POLITICAL   CONSPIRACIES 

ot  course  declined,  but  they  were  nevertheless 
allowed  to  remain  in  Washington  until  they 
voluntarily  left,  after  the  sailing  of  the  second 
Sumter  expedition  on  the  loth  of  April. 

The  Rebellion  records  give  us  the  de 
spatches  and  letters  these  gentlemen  and  other 
confederates  in  political  crime  were  allowed  to 
send  from  Washington  in  the  last  days  of  Mr. 
Buchanan's,  and  in  the  early  days  of  Mr.  Lin 
coln's  administration.  We  will  give  a  few 
samples. 

lolt  succeeds  Floyd.  It  means  war.  Cut  off  sup 
plies  from  Anderson  and  take  Sumter  soon  as  possible. 

Louis  T.  WIGFALL. 

{A  United  States  Senator  drawing  pay  ft  om  the  United  States  Gov 
ernment.} 

President's  reply :  "  Brooklyn  not  for  South  Carolina. 
On  errand  of  mercy  and  relief. 

"JOHN  TYLER." 

This  shows  that  Mr.  Buchanan  was  himself 
responsible  for  the  substitution  of  the  Star  of 
the  West  lor  the  Brooklyn. 

WASHINGTON.  January  8,  1861. 

The  Star  of  the  West  sailed  from  New  York  on  Sun- 
day  with  government  troops  and  provisions.  It  is  said  her 
destination  is  Charleston.  If  so,  she  may  be  hourly  ex 
pected  off  the  harbor. 

Louis  T.  WIGFALL. 


PRECEDING    THE  REBELLION.  55 

The  fact  that  troops  were  on  board  was  sup 
posed  to  be  a  profound  state  secret. 

But  there  seemed  to  be  no  secrets.  Even 
after  Mr.  Lincoln's  inauguration,  despatch  after 
despatch  was  sent  from  Washington  to  the 
Confederate  authorities,  in  relation  to  the  move 
ment  of  troops  and  of  vessels  of  war,  giving  in 
formation  also  as  to  all  that  went  on  in  Cabinet 
meetings  :  that  the  vote  in  Mr.  Lincoln's  Cabi 
net  stood  six  to  one  in  favor  of  withdrawing 
Major  Anderson's  command  from  Sumter  ;  that 
no  faith  could  be  put  in  Seward's  promise,  no 
faith  in  the  administration  ;  and  finally,  on  the 
9th  of  April,  we  have  Mr.  Commissioner  Craw 
ford's  final  despatch  :  "  That  diplomacy  had 
failed.  The  sword  must  now  preserve  our  in 
dependence." 

But  the  most  interesting  despatch  is  this  : 

WASHINGTON,  April  6,  1861. 
Hon.  A.  G.  MAGRATH,  Charleston,  S.  C. 

Positively  determined  not  to  withdraw  Anderson.  Sup 
plies  go  immediately  ;  supported  by  naval  force  under 
Stringham,  if  their  landing  be  resisted. 

(Signed),  A  FRIEND. 

This  "  Friend "  turned  out  to  be  James  E. 
Harvey,  who  subsequently  found  means  to  have 
himself  appointed  Minister  to  Portugal. 

Certainly  there  is  no  other  government  that 


$6  POLITICAL    CONSPIRACIES 

would  have  allowed  such  traitors  to  have  re 
mained  at  large  in  its  capital  for  a  single  day. 

But  the  strangest  thing  in  this  strange,  eventful 
history,  was  the  course  taken  by  the  Secretary  of 
State.  For  years  Mr.  William  H.  Seward  had 
been  the  political  leader  of  Abolitionism  ;  he 
spoke  of  the  antagonism  between  freedom  and 
slavery  as  the  irrepressible  conflict,  and  reiterated 
Mr.  Garrison's  famous  saying,  that  there  is  a 
"  higher  law  than  the  Constitution,"  in  a  debate 
on  the  floor  of  the  Senate.  Yet  no  sooner  had 
he  in  his  official  capacity  declined  to  receive  and 
recognize  Messrs.  Crawford,  Roman,  and  For- 
syth,  in  their  diplomatic  capacity,  than  he  en 
tered  into  a  private  correspondence  and  nego 
tiation  with  them.  The  Secretary  seemed  to 
be  struck  with  judicial  blindness,  and  to  be 
filled  with  hopes  as  vain  as  those  of  the  Bour 
bons  that  their  white  flag  will  once  again  wave 
over  fair  France.  He  yielded  to  the  delusion 
that  the  rebel  States  could  be  induced  to  revoke 
their  ordinances  of  secession  ;  give  up  a  contest 
he  himself  had  declared  to  be  irrepressible,  and 
return  peacefully  to  the  Union.  To  effect  this 
purpose,  he  promised  that  the  garrison  of  Sum- 
ter  should  be  withdrawn. 

At  the  very  time  the  Secretary  of  State  was 
entering  upon  these  ways  that  were  dark  and 


PRECEDING    THE  REBELLION.  $? 

tricks  that  were  vain,  Mr.  Cameron,  the  Secre 
tary  of  War,  laid  before  Mr.  Lincoln  and  his 
Cabinet  a  paper,  already  referred  to,  giving  the 
opinions  of  many  prominent  naval  and  army 
officers,  as  to  the  expediency  and  possibility 
of  relieving  Sumter,  and  their  suggestions  as  to 
how  this  purpose  could  be  best  effected  in  case 
that  course  should  be  determined  on.  By  far 
the  greatest  number  consulted  gave  their  opin 
ion  that  the  attempt  should  not  be  made  with 
the  means  then  at  the  government's  dispos 
al.  With  the  sole  exception  of  the  Hon.  Mont 
gomery  Blair,  the  members  of  the  President's 
Cabinet  advised  him  to  give  up  any  pur 
pose  of  relieving  Fort  Sumter,  and  to  with 
draw  the  garrison  before  the  i5th  of  April, 
when  its  supply  of  subsistence  would  be  ex 
hausted. 

From  a  merely  military  point  of  view,  this 
advice  would  have  been  sound,  but  Mr.  Lincoln 
and  Mr.  Blair  judged  more  wisely  that  it  would 
be  better  to  sacrifice  the  garrison  of  Sumter  for 
political  effect.  As  nearly  all  his  military  ad 
visers  had  given  their  reasons  for  believing 
that  Fort  Sumter  could  not  be  relieved  by  less 
than  an  army  of  twenty  thousand  men  and  a 
powerful  fleet,  the  President  must  have  known 
that  his  expedition  of  two  hundred  men,  mostly 


58  POLITICAL    CONSPIRACIES 

recruits,  and  the  absurd  naval  force,  under  Mr. 
Fox,  would  fail  as  it  did  fail.  But  the  expedi 
tion  was  sent  in  accordance  with  a  generous 
public  sentiment,  and  with  the  knowledge  that 
it  would  compel  the  rebels  to  strike  the  first 
blow.  If  the  last  man  in  the  garrison  of  Sum- 
ter  had  perished,  it  would  have  been  a  cheap 
price  to  pay  for  the  magnificent  outburst  of 
patriotism  that  followed.  Indeed  it  might  have 
been  better  if  they  had. 

If  the  example  of  no  surrender  had  been  set 
there,  we  would  have  had  fewer  capitulations  to 
armed  rebels  afterward. 

When  Mr.  Seward  found  that  Mr.  Lincoln 
had  determined  to  reinforce  both  Sumter  and 
Pickens,  he  notified  the  rebel  Commissioners  of 
the  fact,  and  induced  the  President  to  send  for 
mal  notice  to  the  authorities  at  Charleston. 
This  note  was  delivered  on  the  night  of  April 
8,  1 86 1,  to  General  Beauregard  and  Governor 
Pickens.  Then,  too,  the  extraordinary  plot  was 
carried  out,  by  which  the  Powhatan  was  de 
tached  from  the  Sumter  expedition  and  sent  to 
Florida.  The  order  was  sent  on  board  of  her 
after  she  was  steaming  down  the  harbor  and 
just  passing  Staten  Island. 

Mr.  Gideon  Welles,  in  his  reminiscences,  is 
very  severe  in  his  condemnation  of  the  decep- 


PRECEDING    THE  REBELLION.  59 

tion  Mr.  Seward  practised  in  this  matter  both  on 
the  Secretaries  of  War  and  the  Navy.  He  as 
serts  that  it  was  prompted  by  his  determination 
to  make  good  his  promise  to  the  rebel  Commis 
sioners,  that  Sumter  should  be  evacuated.  Mr. 
Blair  (the  Secretary  of  the  Interior),  in  a  letter 
published  in  Mr.  Welles'  reminiscences  (p.  66), 
says  : 

"  Mr.  Seward  had  two  objects  in  detaching 
this  vessel  (the  Pvwhatan). 

"  ist. — It  defeated  the  relief  of  Fort  Sumter 
which  he  was  pledged  to  surrender. 

"  2d. — Fort  Pickens  could  be  claimed  as  hav 
ing  been  saved  by  an  expedition  conceived  and 
carried  into  execution  under  his  orders,  and  so, 
though  he  would  by  this  movement  abandon 
his  method  of  meeting  exactions  with  conces 
sions,  and  violence  with  peace,  he  would  signal 
ize  his  abandonment  of  his  peace  policy  by  a 
success  in  administering  the  force  policy,  as 
would  put  himself  per  saltum  at  the  head  of  his 
opponents." 

It  has  been  asserted  that  General  Scott  was 
opposed  to  the  relief  of  Sumter  from  his  south 
ern  sympathies,  and  that  General  Anderson  was 
lukewarm  in  its  defence  for  the  same  reason. 

These  charges  against  those  distinguished 
officers  can  be  examined  together. 


60  POLITICAL    CONSPIRACIES 

One  of  the  lieut.-general's  avowed  reasons 
for  not  approving  attempts  for  the  relief  of 
Sumter  was,  that  Major  Anderson  had  never 
asked  for  reinforcements  after  he  occupied  that 
post.  This  was  not  only  true,  but  that  officer 
had  written  to  the  adjutant-general  on  the  6th 
of  January,  that  he  would  not  ask  for  reinforce 
ments,  because  he  did  not  know  what  the  ulteri 
or  designs  of  the  government  were,  and  for 
the  further  reason  that  from  that  time  on  he 
could  only  be  relieved  by  a  powerful  fleet. 

His  first  report  read  to  Mr.  Lincoln  was  this : 
"  I  confess  that  I  would  not  be  willing  to  risk 
my  reputation  on  an  attempt  to  throw  reinforce 
ments  into  this  harbor  within  the  time  for  our 
relief  rendered  necessary  by  the  limited  supply 
of  our  provisions,  and  with  a  view  of  holding 
possession  of  the  same,  with  a  force  of  less  than 

twenty    thousand    good    and    well-disciplined 

»  • 

men. 

At  this  time  General  Scott  and  Major  Ander 
son  had  probably  a  perfect  understanding  and 
agreement  about  the  Sumter  problem.  They 
had  long  been  intimate  personal  friends.  Major 
Anderson's  eldest  brother,  who  died  as  our  first 
minister  to  Columbia,  had  been  a  classmate 
with  Scott  at  William  and  Mary's  College  in 
Virginia.  Anderson  himself  had  been  several 


PRECEDING    THE  REBELLION.  6 1 

times  on  the  staff  of  the  old  chief.  At  the  battle 
of  Moleno  del  Rey  in  Mexico,  Scott  had  to  send 
his  friend  on  a  most  desperate  attack,  in  which 
he  received  five  wounds  and  nearly  lost  his  life. 
After  that  General  Scott  always  showed  the 
greatest  sympathy  and  regard  for  him.  More 
over  Major  Anderson  had  married  a  daughter 
of  General  Clinch,  an  old  compatriot  of  Scott's. 
They  were  both  border  State  men,  and  had,  in 
fine,  a  remarkable  concordance  in  sympathies 
and  opinions. 

It  is  important  to  state  these  facts  in  this  con 
nection,  because  if  General  Scott  afterward  ap 
parently  abandoned  one  of  his  most  cherished 
friends  to  his  fate,  he  must  evidently  have  been 
influenced  by  some  powerful  consideration. 

It  will  be  remembered  that  in  his  first  letter 
from  Moultrie,  Major  Anderson  had  urged  the 
occupation  in  force  of  Castle  Pinckney  and  Forts 
Sumter  and  Moultrie.  The  military  reason  for 
this  is  obvious.  Castle  Pinckney  could  com 
mand  and  overawe  Charleston  so  long  as 
Sumter  and  Moultrie  kept  open  its  communi 
cation  with  the  sea. 

In  Major  Andersons  opinion  all  three  forts  or 
none  should  have  been  held. 

With  the  rest  of  the  harbor  held  by  an  enemy, 
Fort  Sumter  was  useless  and  untenable.  At 


62  POLITICAL    CONSPIRACIES 

a  time  of  great  political  excitement,  he  wrote 
of  making  the  fort  impregnable,  but  General 
Scott  knew  better,  aad  every  officer  consulted 
by  the  Secretary  of  War  put  himself  on  record 
to  the  contrary.  General  Anderson  was  a  good 
artillery  officer,  the  author  or  compiler  of  the 
artillery  text-books  we  were  using  at  that  time, 
and  he  really  knew  better.  He  told  the  writer 
that  he  knew  his  garrison  was  being  sacrificed 
to  a  political  necessity,  and  that  therefore  he  did 
not  wish  another  man  to  be  sent  to  him.  Dur 
ing  the  months  of  January  and  February  all  the 
cotton  States  seceded,  and  Anderson  knew  per 
fectly  well  that  they  could  surround  him  with 
an  army  of  twenty  thousand  men.  He  has  also 
been  censured  by  so-called  soldiers  and  plaintive 
patriots  for  not  opening  fire  when  the  rebels  be 
gan  placing  batteries  around  him. 

The  writer  once  asked  him  why  he  did  not 
open  fire  when  he  saw  the  first  shovelful  of 
earth  turned  at  Cummings'  Point.  He  replied, 
in  effect,  that  he  had  three  reasons  :  First,  he 
was  not  perfectly  secure  against  escalade  until 
the  middle  of  January  ;  secondly,  he  had  orders 
to  await  attack ;  and,  thirdly,  that  he  had  not 
been  educated  to  consider  the  Secretary  of  War 
a  traitor  (referring  to  Floyd). 

I  have  before  said  that  the  majority  of  Mr. 


PRECEDING    THE  REBELLION.  63 

Buchanan's  reconstructed  Cabinet  were  able 
and  patriotic  men.  Why  was  it  that  Major 
Anderson's  orders  were  not  changed  under 
their  administration  ?  They  were  temporizing 
to  save  the  border  States.  We  know  now  that 
they  were  attempting  a  vain  thing.  It  was  not 
thought  so  then.  The  hopeful  put  faith  in 
peace  conventions  and  Crittenden  compromises. 
If  Major  Anderson  had  opened  fire  on  the 
Carolina  militia  on  the  27th  of  December,  let  us 
speculate  for  a  moment  on  the  probable  re 
sults. 

Would  Mr.  Buchanan  have  called  out  the 
military  strength  of  the  nation  to  have  sustained 
him? 

It  is  certain  he  would  not.  Then,  no  mat 
ter  what  the  fate  of  Sumter,  which,  indeed, 
would  have  been  as  dust  in  the  balance,  the 
obvious  result  would  have  been  that  Mr.  Lin 
coln  could  only  have  gone  to  Washington  like 
Cromwell,  at  the  head  of  his  Covenanters. 
What  a  sad  precedent  would  this  have  been  ? 
What  a  loss  of  prestige  ?  What  a  sacrifice  of 
moral  power? 

The  State  of  Kentucky,  instead  of  remaining 
loyal,  would  have  been  actively  hostile,  and  the 
war  would  have  opened  at  once  on  the  Ohio  and 
the  Potomac. 


64  POLITICAL    CONSPIRACIES 

In  that  event  thousands  of  hardy  troops  that 
hastened  to  the  defence  of  the  national  capital 
would,  in  the  first  instance,  have  had  to  guard 
their  own  borders.  McClellan  and  Rosecrantz 
could  not  have  invaded  Western  Virginia  if 
rebel  camp-fires  had  been  lighted  on  the  hills 
back  of  Covington.  The  ultimate  result  might 
have  been  the  same,  but  the  final  triumph 
would  have  been  more  difficult  and  long  de 
ferred. 

General  Anderson's  course  at  Sumter,  and 
his  popularity  as  a  Kentuckian,  turned  the 
wavering  sentiment  in  that  State  in  favor  of  the 
the  Union.  It  was  in  recognition  of  this  fact 
that  Mr.  Lincoln,  himself  a  Kentuckian,  sent 
General  Anderson  there  as  the  first  department 
commander. 

These  considerations  had  also  great  influence 
with  General  Scott.  But  when  Judge  Black 
was  urging  him,  much  too  late,  to  send  re 
inforcements  to  Sumter,  he  was  also  possessed 
with  the  idea  that  the  rebels  had  formed  a  plot 
to  seize  Washington  City  just  before  Mr.  Lin 
coln's  inauguration.  Our  navy  was  scattered 
over  the  four  quarters  of  the  globe,  and  our 
little  army  was,  for  the  most  part,  stationed  in 
insignificant  fragments  on  our  most  distant 
frontiers.  To  collect  a  few  reliable  regulars 


PRECEDING    THE  REBELLION.  65 

in  Washington  was  his  first  and  greatest 
care. 

Yet  why  did  he  not  reinforce  Sumter  after 
the  capital  was  secured  ? 

I  can  also  answer  this  question. 

I  once  heard  General  Scott  and  General 
Anderson  discuss  the  Sumter  problem  in  New 
York  City,  during  the  siege  of  Fort  Wagner 
by  General  Gilmore.  Some  one  asked  General 
Anderson  as  to  the  best  way  of  taking  Sumter. 
He  replied  :  "  Take  Charleston."  General  Scott 
then  said  :  "  Yes,  Robert,  that  is  the  way  to  take 
the  Charleston  forts.  To  attack  Sumter  from 
the  sea,  is  taking  hold  of  the  wrong  end  of  the 
poker." 

There  are  only  two  other  points  in  connec 
tion  with  this  famous  siege  that  require  notice. 

Mr.  Blair,  in  his  published  letter,  already  re 
ferred  to,  makes  this  statement : 

"  General  Anderson  had  made  preparations 
to  defend  it  (Sumter),  but  left  his  barracks  stand 
ing,  to  be  fired  at  the  first  shot,  instead  of  pull 
ing  them  down  and  taking  to  his  casemates  as 
he  certainly  would  have  done  if  he  had  not  been 
authoritatively  told  that  the  fort  was  to  be  evacu 
ated  as  soon  as  the  small  supply  of  provisions 
on  hand  had  been  consumed." 

In  this  connection  I  beg  leave  to  quote  from 


66  POLITICAL   CONSPIRACIES 

a  letter  written  to  me  by  General  Truman  Sey 
mour  on  this  subject.  Seymour  commanded  one 
of  the  companies  of  artillery  in  Sumter,  and  was 
General  Anderson's  room-mate  during  the  siege. 
"  General  Anderson  did  not  take  down  '  the 
wooden  barracks  '  at  Sumter — the  necessity  for 
which  was  so  sagely  suggested  by  Mr.  Blair, — 
because  there  were  none  to  take  down  !  The 
three  barracks  were  permanent  structures  of 
brick,  three  stories  high,  and  built  solidly  against 
the  faces  of  the  casemates  ;  they  were  con 
structed  by  the  engineers  to  be  fire-proof,  and 
were  supposed  so  to  be  :  not  a  member  of  the 
garrison  ever  suspected  they  would  or  could  be 
consumed  as  they  were.  The  floors  were  of 
brick  arches  upon  iron  beams,  overlaid  by  a 
board  floor  ;  the  sash  and  casings  of  windows 
were  of  wood,  and  the  slate  roofing  was  fastened 
to  board  sheathing.  The  burning  of  these 
buildings  was  only  a  temporary  inconvenience  ; 
after  the  dense  smoke  had  been  blown  off 
there  was  no  longer  any  point  worthy  of  notice  in 
connection  with  them.  The  burning  of  the  gates 
to  the  fort  could  easily  have  been  made  good 
by  the  rubbish  near  it.  When  Sumter  was  oc 
cupied,  the  parade  was  crowded  with  wooden 
sheds,  shops,  etc.,  all  of  which  were  soon  cleared 
away. 


PRECEDING    THE  REBELLION.  67 

"  The  point  made  by  Mr.  Blair  is  too  absurd 
to  be  worthy  even  of  refutation  ;  he  should 
have  known  better  (as  a  graduate  of  West 
Point)  than  to  have  raised  it. 

"  General  Anderson  never  had  the  slightest 
suggestion  from  the  government,  or  from  any 
member  of  it,  that  the  command  would  be  with 
drawn.  He  would  doubtless  have  felt  profoundly 
humiliated  at  any  such  acknowledgment  of 
weakness — so  would  any  of  the  officers  there." 

Strange  as  it  may  seem,  General  Seymour 
was  mistaken  in  supposing  that  his  commanding 
officer  had  never  received  an  intimation  that 
the  garrison  of  Sumter  would  be  withdrawn. 
On  the  25th  of  March  Mr.  Lamon,  Mr.  Lin 
coln's  private  secretary,  went  to  Sumter  and 
told  Major  Anderson  that  in  a  few  days  his 
command  would  probably  be  transferred  to 
another  fort.  He  also  made  the  same  communi 
cation  to  Governor  Pickens.  It  shows  how 
closely  Anderson  kept  his  counsel,  when  he 
never  communicated  this  intelligence  to  his 
second  in  command.  This  gave  rise  to  a  very 
strange  episode.1 

1  The  Chew  Memorandum,  presented  to  Gov.  Pickens  and  Gen. 
Beauregard  by  Lieut.  Talbot  and  Robert  S.  Chew,  Esq.,  was  as  fol 
lows  : 

"  I  am  directed  by  the  President  of  the  United  States  to  notify 
you  to  expect  an  attempt  will  be  made  to  supply  Fort  Sumter  with 
provisions  only,  and  that  if  such  an  attempt  be  not  resisted,  no  effort 


68  POLITICAL   CONSPIRACIES 

The  next  day  General  Beauregard  wrote 
Major  Anderson  a  very  friendly  personal  note, 
congratulating  him  on  his  prospective  removal, 
offering  to  give  him  every  assistance  possible, 
but  saying  finally  that  he  would  only  require  of 
him  his  statement  on  honor,  that  he  had  not 
mined  the  fort.  ("  Rebellion  Records,"  vol.  i,  p. 
222.)  Anderson  replied :  *  *  *  "I  must  state 
most  distinctly,  that  if  I  can  only  be  per 
mitted  to  leave  on  the  pledge  you  mention,  I 
shall  never,  so  help  me,  God,  leave  this  fort 
alive."  (Ibid.) 

There  was  a  rumor  that  Fort  Sumter  was  to 
be  blown  up  by  the  Yankees  when  they  left  it. 

Curiously  enough,  Captain  Foster  had  writ 
ten  to  the  Chief  of  Engineers,  December  19, 
1860,  "that  he  proposed  to  connect  a  power 
ful  Daniel's  battery  with  the  magazine  at  Sum 
ter,  by  means  of  wires  stretched  across  under 
water  to  Fort  Moultrie,  and  to  blow  up  Sumter 
if  taken  by  an  armed  force." 

This,  of  course,  was  before  that  fort  was  oc 
cupied  by  our  people.  But  how  did  the  rebels 
get  the  rumor  ?  Evidently  there  was  a  leaky 
vessel  in  the  Engineer  Department. 

to  throw  in  men,  arms,  or  ammunition  will  be  made  without  further 
notice,  or  in  case  of  an  attack  on  the  fort. 

"AprilS,  1861." 

This  memorandum  was  not  communicated  to  Major  Anderson,  and 
the  Powhatan,  with  the  troops,  was  secretly  detached. 


PRECEDING  THE  REBELLION.        69 

It  may  be  inferred  from  General  Seymour's 
letter  that  he  believed  that  the  fort  could  have 
been  held  longer ;  Captain  Foster,  in  his  report 
of  the  siege,  also  says  as  much. 

This  is  undoubtedly  true.  By  putting  the 
garrison  on  starvation  rations  of  pork,  the  fort 
could  probably  have  been  held  for  a  week  or 
ten  days  longer.  But  what  would  have  been 
gained  by  this  delay  ?  There  were  eighty  men 
(only  thirty-five  of  whom  were  skilled  artiller 
ists)  holding  a  sea-coast  fort  against  eight  thou 
sand.  Apart  from  the  moral  effect,  the  only 
purpose  in  delay  would  have  been  to  have 
kept  this  many  men  a  little  longer  from  the 
Northern  frontier.  This  would  have  been  a 
sufficient  reason,  and  the  sacrifice  would  have 
been  made,  had  the  government  ever  intimated 
its  desire  that  it  should  be  made. 

The  Administration  of  Mr.  Lincoln  showed 
nothing  but  doubt  and  vacillation  in  regard  to 
the  Sumter  question,  up  to  the  time  of  the  fall 
of  the  fort. 

Evidently  all  it  cared  for  was  a  show  of  force 
on  the  part  of  the  garrison,  and  a  proof  of 
aggression  on  the  part  of  the  rebels. 

This  is  unquestionably  so,  or  they  would  not 
have  greeted  the  defenders  of  Sumter  with 
thanks  and  approval. 


70  POLITICAL   CONSPIRACIES 

The  truth  is,  I  believe,  that  they  intended  to 
sacrifice  them  for  moral  effect,  and  both  the 
Administration  and  the  nation  were  happy  to 
see  them  get  off  with  their  lives. 

From  February  23d  to  April  4th,  no  orders 
were  sent  from  the  War  Department  to  Fort 
Sumter.  Its  commanding  officer  was  thrown 
on  his  own  resources,  left  to  his  own  devices, 
yet  hampered  by  the  old  order  not  to  fire  unless 
attacked.  At  last,  however,  Secretary  Cameron 
sent  the  following  autograph  letter  : 

WAR  DEPARTMENT. 

WASHINGTON,  D.  C.,  April  4,  1861. 
Major  ROBERT  ANDERSON,  U.  S.  Army. 

SIR  :  Your  letter  of  the  ist  instant  occasioned  some 
anxiety  to  the  President. 

On  the  information  of  Captain  Fox,  he  had  supposed 
you  could  hold  out  till  the  i5th  instant  without  any  great 
inconvenience,  and  had  prepared  an  expedition  to  relieve 
you  before  that  period. 

Hoping  still  that  you  will  be  able  to  sustain  yourself 
till  the  nth  or  i2th  instant,  the  expedition  will  go  for* 
ward  ;  and,  finding  your  flag  flying  will  attempt  to  provis 
ion  you  ;  and,  in  case  the  effort  is  resisted,  will  endeavor 
also  to  reinforce  you. 

You  will  therefore  hold  out,  if  possible,  till  the  arrival 
of  the  expedition. 

It  is  not,  however,  the  intention  of  the  President  to  sub 
ject  your  command  to  any  danger  or  hardship  beyond  what, 
in  your  judgment,  would  be  usual  in  military  life  ;  and  he 


PRECEDING    THE  REBELLION.  /I 

has   entire   confidence   that   you  will  act  as  becomes  a 
patriot  and  soldier  under  all  circumstances. 

Whenever,  if  at  all,  in  your  judgment,  to  save  yourself 
and  command,  a  capitulation  becomes  a  necessity,  you  are 
authorized  to  make  it. 

SIMON  CAMERON, 

Secretary  of  War. 

The  answer  to  the  above  letter  was  inter 
cepted  by  the  Confederates  and  sent  to  Mont 
gomery.  It  never  reached  Washington  until  it 
went  there  with  the  Confederate  archives.  It 
was  accompanied  by  a  private  note  to  Colonel 
Thomas  asking  him  to  destroy  it. 

[No.  96.]  FORT  SUMTER,  S.  C.,  April 8,  1861. 

Col.  L.  THOMAS, 

Adjutant-General,  U.  S.  Army. 

COLONEL  :  I  have  the  honor  to  report  that  the  re 
sumption  of  work  yesterday  (Sunday)  at  various  points  on 
Morris  Island,  and  the  vigorous  prosecution  of  it  this 
morning,  apparently  strengthening  nearly  all  the  batteries 
which  are  under  the  fire  of  our  guns,  show  that  they 
either  have  received  some  news  from  Washington  which 
has  put  them  on  the  qui  vive,  or  that  they  have  received 
orders  from  Montgomery  to  commence  operations  here. 
I  am  preparing  by  the  side  of  my  barbette  guns  protection 
for  our  men  from  the  shells,  which  will  be  almost  con 
tinuously  bursting  over  or  in  our  work. 

I  had  the  honor  to  receive  by  yesterday's  mail  the  let 
ter  of  the  honorable  Secretary  of  War,  dated  April  4,  and 
confess  that  what  he  there  states  surprises  me  very 
greatly,  following  as  it  does,  and  contradicting  so  posi- 


?2  POLITICAL    CONSPIRACIES 

tively,  the  assurance  Mr.  Crawford  telegraphed  he  was 
authorized  to  make.  I  trust  that  this  matter  will  be  at 
once  put  in  a  correct  light,  as  a  movement  made  now, 
when  the  South  has  been  erroneously  informed  that  none 
such  will  be  attempted,  would  produce  most  disastrous 
results  throughout  our  country. 

It  is,  of  course,  now  too  late  for  me  to  give  any  advice 
in  reference  to  the  proposed  scheme  of  Captain  Fox.  I 
fear  that  its  result  cannot  fail  to  be  disastrous  to  all  con 
cerned.  Even  with  his  boat  at  our  walls,  the  loss  of  life 
(as  I  think  I  mentioned  to  Mr.  Fox)  in  unloading  her 
will  more  than  pay  for  the  good  to  be  accomplished  by 
the  expedition,  which  keeps  us,  if  I  can  maintain  posses 
sion  of  this  work,  out  of  position,  surrounded  by  strong 
works,  which  must  be  carried  to  make  this  fort  of  the  least 
value  to  the  United  States  Government. 

We  have  not  oil  enough  to  keep  a  light  in  the  lantern 
for  one  night.  The  boats  will  have,  therefore,  to  rely  at 
night  entirely  upon  other  marks.  I  ought  to  have  been 
informed  that  this  expedition  was  to  come.  Colonel 
Lamon's  remark  convinced  me  that  the  idea,  merely 
hinted  at  to  me  by  Captain  Fox,  would  not  be  car 
ried  out.  We  shall  strive  to  do  our  duty,  though  I 
frankly  say  that  my  heart  is  not  in  the  war  which  I  see  is 
to  be  thus  commenced.  That  God  will  still  avert  it,  and 
cause  us  to  resort  to  pacific  measures  to  maintain  our 
rights,  is  my  ardent  prayer. 

I  am,  Colonel,  very  respectfully, 

Your  obedient  servant, 

ROBERT  ANDERSON, 

Major \  First  Artillery \  Commanding. 

In  a  previous  letter  Major  Anderson  had  re 
proached  the  War  Department  for  leaving  him, 


PRECEDING   THE  REBELLION.  73 

after  nearly  forty  years'  service,  without  orders, 
intelligence,  or  advice. 

It  is  on  the  the  strength  of  the  expression, 
"  I  frankly  say  that  my  heart  is  not  in  the  war," 
that  General  Doubleday  accuses  General  Ander 
son  of  want  of  loyalty  and  of  being  pro-slavery  in 
sympathy. 

It  so  happens  that  after  nearly  forty  years  of 
faithful  service,  the  fame  of  that  officer  has 
come  to  rest  on  one  episode  of  his  life — his  de 
fence  of  Moultrie  and  Sumter.  He  fought 
bravely  in  the  Black  Hawk,  the  Seminole,  and 
the  Mexican  wars.  He  served  with  distinction 
on  the  staff  of  Lieut-General  Scott.  He  wrote 
several  useful  works  for  his  branch  of  the  ser 
vice,  and  did  as  much  hard  work  as  any  officer 
of  his  day  ;  yet  if  it  can  be  made  to  appear  that 
he  was  weak,  unwise,  or  wicked  in  the  per 
formance  of  his  last  great  trust,  then  his  long 
years  of  honorable  toil  will  have  been  in  vain, 
for  it  is  always  the  last  important  act  that  gives 
tone  and  color  to  the  picture  of  our  lives. 

No  wonder  he  used  the  expression  attributed 
to  him.  For  months  he  had  been  isolated.  He 
felt  deserted  and  sacrificed.  He  had  seen  the 
ebb-tide  of  patriotism,  and  the  shoals  and  quick 
sands  it  left  around  him  ;  he  did  not  know  of 
the  mighty  tidal  wave  of  national  feeling  that 


74  POLITICAL   CONSPIRACIES 

had  commenced  its  flow.  What  wonder  was  it 
that  he  was  sick  at  heart  ?  Brutus  at  Philippi 
shrank  for  a  moment  before  the  premonition  of 
his  doom.  Peter  denied  his  Master,  and  the 
Master  himself  upon  the  cross  cried  out :  "  Eli, 
Eli,  lama  sabachthanl  ?  " 

Who  did  not  recoil  from  that  prospect  that 
appalled  Webster, — "  of  States  dissevered,  dis 
cordant,  belligerent ;  of  a  land  rent  with  civil 
feuds,  and  drenched,  it  may  be,  in  fraternal 
blood?" 

There  was  not  an  honest  and  patriotic  man 
in  the  country  who  did  not  dread  to  see  the 
war  begun.  And  of  all  sorts  and  conditions  of 
men  the  soldier  best  knows  the  horrors  of  war, 
and  is  most  unwilling  to  see  his  own  country 
subjected  to  its  miseries.  Of  course  their  finer 
feelings  are  blunted  in  the  heat  of  action. 

"  The  blood  more  stirs  to  rouse  a  lion 
Than  to  start  a  hare." 

No  one  has  ever  claimed  that  the  siege  of 
Sumter  was  at  all  remarkable  in  a  military 
sense.  It  was  a  moral  and  not  a  military  crisis. 

The  Count  of  Paris  says  of  General  Ander 
son,  that  "  he  showed  a  great  moral  courage — a 
very  rare  thing  in  revolutions." 

The  government  hesitated  to  strike,  and  let 


PRECEDING    THE  REBELLION.  75 

I  dare  not  wait  upon  I  would.  It  hesitated  and 
temporized,  apparently  weighing  small  physical 
advantages  against  the  prestige  of  moral 
right.  It  seemed  at  first  more  inclined  to  fol 
low  the  Macchiavellian  policy  of  Louis  XI, 
rather  than  the  braver  example  of  Themis- 
tocles. 

But  Anderson's  action  changed  all  this.  The 
struggle  inaugurated  at  Sumter  ended  in  a 
great  revolution. 

In  this  contest,  while  the  South  was  in  re 
bellion,  it  was  the  North  that  forced  the  revo 
lution. 

Formerly  we  had  only  a  Union  of  States, 
now  we  have  a  United  People.  Formerly  we 
claimed  to  be  a  nation  only  by  the  consent  of 
Sovereign  members  bound  by  artificial  ties ; 
now  we  claim  to  be  a  Sovereign  People  devel 
oped  through  psychological  laws. 

Like  other  nations  we  are  beginning  to  have 
an  autonomy  of  action  and  a  political  equation. 

The  next  and  not  less  important  feature  in 
our  Revolution  was  the  abolition  of  slavery. 
We  cast  out  that  unclean  thing,  because  it  had 
become  heterogeneous  and  hateful.  We  placed 
the  higher  law  of  Equality  in  our  Constitu 
tion,  because  it  was  of  endogenous  growth. 
This  necessity  for  a  change  in  our  government 


?  POLITICAL   CONSPIRACIES. 

had  grown  out  of  a  change  in  our  character  as 
a  people.  Such  a  time  in  a  nation's  life  is  like 
a  crisis  in  a  disease.  A  nation  that  cannot 
stand  it,  disintegrates.  We  have  had  our  -  trial 
and  tragedy,  and  bitter  and  bloody  it  was. 
But  now  that  the  issue  is  settled,  we  should 
criticise  the  events  of  the  time  and  the  men  of 
that  hour  with  all  possible  fairness. 

There  is  glory  enough  for  all.  And  although 
those  who  came  at  the  eleventh  hour  should 
receive  their  reward,  even  as  those  who  came 
at  the  first,  yet  the  nation  will  not  forget  those 
who  were  the  first  to  stand  firm,  and  who  were 
faithful  among  the  faithless  and  faithful  to  the 
end. 


CHAPTER  II. 

RETROSPECTIVE. 

IF  the  familiar  statement  were  renewed  that 
Republican  governments  have  produced 
more  than  their  share  of  the  great  men  of  his 
tory,  it  would  be  accepted  as  a  truism  by  nearly 
all  readers  of  the  English-speaking  race*  If  a 
second  thought  were  given  to  the  proposition, 
the  heroes  of  Plutarch,  and  the  Hampdens  and 
Cromwells,  the  Washingtons  and  Lincolns  of 
modern  times  would  be  passed  in  almost  un 
conscious  mental  review  as  a  satisfactory  illus 
tration  of  the  assumption.  Yet  all  thoughtful 
men  of  our  time  know  that  there  is  a  reverse  to 
our  Democratic  medallion. 

If  very  heroic  qualities  are  developed  in  our 
times  of  trial,  very  undesirable  qualities  are 
manifested  in  our  seasons  of  prosperity.  That 
majorities  can  be  as  despotic  as  crowned  kings, 
is  pretty  generally  conceded.  That  popular 
opinion  is  as  impatient  of  contradiction  as  the 
most  pedantic  pedagogue,  seems  to  be  as  unde- 

77 


78  POLITICAL   CONSPIRACIES 

niably  true.  Hence  it  too  often  happens  that 
in  republics  there  is  a  certain  duplicity  or  ti 
midity  in  criticism,  if  the  question  to  be  examined 
is  one  about  which  a  popular  opinion  has  been 
formed. 

Mr.  John  Stuart  Mill  was  asked  on  the  hust 
ings,  on  the  only  occasion  on  which  he  stood 
for  Parliament,  if  he  had  not  said  that  the  Brit 
ish  working-men  were  given  to  lying.  Mr.  Mill 
said,  unhesitatingly,  that  he  had.  The  British 
mob  were  generous  enough  to  cheer  him.  No 
doubt  they  consoled  themselves  with  the  thought 
that,  on  Falstaff's  authority,  the  whole  world 
was  given  to  the  same  practice. 

The  American  public  have  not  been  accused 
of  this  fault,  yet,  in  discussing  the  causes  and 
purposes  of  our  late  civil  war,  there  is  a  very 
politic,  yet  positive,  suppressio  veri. 

We  all  talk  and  write  as  if  our  fore-thoughts 
had  been  the  same  as  our  after- thoughts.  In 
the  hurley-burley  of  the  present  we  forget  the 
passions  and  prejudices  of  the  past.  There 
seems  to  be  a  quiet  assumption  on  the  part 
of  most  middle-aged  men  that  their  political 
opinions  have  not  changed  since  the  rebel  guns 
opened  on  Sumter.  We  are  all  political  proph 
ets,  but,  unfortunately,  prophets  after  the  facts. 

Nearly  all  men  condemn  slavery  now.     This 


PRECEDING  THE   REBELLION.  79 

is  right  and  proper.  The  image  of  Dagon  is 
overthrown.  Who  ever  worshipped  Dagon  ? 
No  man.  It  is  a  safe  and  pleasant  thing  to  re 
vile  a  blind  and  helpless  Samson. 

If  our  elections  are  any  index  to  popular  opin 
ion,  the  great  majority  of  voters  in  this  country 
up  to  1860  either  did  not  believe  that  slavery- 
was  wrong  or  were  indifferent  to  it  as  a  political 
issue.  If  Mr.  Lincoln  had  proclaimed  on  the 
4th  of  March,  1861,  that  he  was  about  to  wage 
a  war  for  the  suppression  of  slavery,  in  all 
human  probability  his  administration  would 
have  proved  an  utter  failure.1 

There  is  one  thing  in  connection  with  our 
civil  war  that  we  have  almost  forgotten,  and 
which  future  historians  are  likely  to  overlook. 
It  is,  that  the  cause  of  the  gravest  apprehension 
to  all  thoughtful  men  and  women  in  all  parts  of 
our  country  was  at  that  time  the  fear  of  a  ser 
vile  insurrection  in  the  South.  Undoubtedly 
one  of  the  gravest  sins  the  rebel  leaders  have 
to  answer  for  is,  that  in  bringing  on  the  war, 

1  The  Abolition  party  so  late  as  the  Presidental  election  of  1852  only 
numbered  is6,i49(Hale's  vote),  out  of  a  total  of  3,144,201  votes  cast. 

It  was  often  mentioned  as  a  matter  of  ridicule  or  reproach  during 
the  war,  that  the  original  abolitionists  were  rarely  found  at  the  front. 
It  cannot  be  fairly  assumed  that  this  fact  proves  their  insincerity.  A 
large  proportion  of  these  fanatics  were  preachers,  scholars,  quakers, 
or  aged  men,  whose  age,  infirmities,  or  callings  prevented  them  from 
becoming  military  crusaders  in  the  cause.  I  do  not  doubt  that  Gid- 
dings,  Garrison,  or  Wendell  Phillips  would  have  died  at  the  stake 
rather  than  denied  their  abolition  sentiments. 


8O  POLITICAL  CONSPIRACIES 

they  risked  this  fate  for  their  misguided  fol 
lowers. 

I  can  state  on  the  best  possible  authority  that 
General  Anderson  dreaded  this  possibility  with 
the  most  painful  intensity.  And  why  was  this 
apprehension  not  realized  ?  Simply  and  solely 
because  slavery  degraded  and  emasculated  the 
black  race  more  than  we  thought.1 

If,  for  instance,  the  slaves  had  retained  the 
courage  and  wild  spirit  of  freedom  of  the  Zulu 
Kaffirs,  who  does  not  know  that  there  would 
have  been  a  holocaust  of  houses,  barns,  and 
bridges  all  through  the  South,  as  soon  as  the 
Federal  soldiers  crossed  the  Potomac  ?  What 
murders,  torturings,  and  ravishings  would  there 
not  have  been  had  a  black  Spartacus  arisen  in 
every  Southern  State  !  Is  this  mere  theorizing  ? 
Ask  the  people  of  Northern  Minnesota  what 
atrocities  the  Sioux  committed  when  they  took 
the  war-path  in  1863.  And  the  provocation  of 

1 1  am  indebted  for  this  statement  and  the  deduction  made  from  it, 
to  Gov.  Chas.  Anderson,  the  sole  surviving  brother  of  Gen.  Robert 
Anderson. 

About  the  time  of  the  bombardment  of  Sumter,  Gov.  Anderson 
made  a  Union  speech  in  San  Antonio,  Texas,  during  the  delivery  of 
which  his  life  was  repeatedly  threatened  by  armed  desperadoes,  who 
were  enraged  by  his  vehement  denunciation  of  the  rebel  leaders. 

He  was  subsequently  imprisoned  by  Gen.  Ben.  McCollough,  C.  S. 
A.,  but  made  a  remarkable  escape  into  Mexico.  He  made  his  way 
back  to  Ohio,  and  was  commissioned  Colonel  of  the  6$d  Ohio  In  ft. 
He  was  wounded  at  Stone  River,  ran  on  the  Republican  ticket  for 
Lieut.  Governor  of  Ohio,  was  elected  by  a  100,000  majority,  and  suc 
ceeded  Brough  as  governor  on  his  death  in  1865. 


PRECEDING  THE  REBELLION.  8 1 

the  worst-used  Indian  tribe  we  ever  cheated 
out  of  home  and  lands  was  mild  as  moonlight 
compared  to  the  curse  and  wrong  of  slavery. 

Fortunately,  these  apprehensions  were  not 
realized.  But  we  can  not  fairly  judge  of  the  men 
who  were  prominent  actors  in  the  first  act  of 
our  Rebellion,  without  analyzing  all  the  consid 
erations  that  influenced  them  at  that  time. 

The  abolition  of  slavery  was  not  one  of  the 
objects,  but  one  of  the  accidents,  of  the  war. 
We  may  say  now  that  it  would  have  been  a 
justifiable  and  praiseworthy  object ;  yet  this  is 
an  after-thought. 

It  must  be  stated,  in  all  fairness,  that  although 
a  great  many  people  thought  slavery  was  wrong, 
even  before  our  war,  yet  so  strong  was  the  rev 
erence  for  the  written  law,  that  but  few  would 
have  risked  a  war  to  abolish  it. 

The  object  of  the  war  is  generally  and  more 
properly  stated  to  have  been  the  preservation 
of  the  Union.  Admitting  that  this  was  its  ob 
ject,  it  must  now  be  admitted  that  there  was  an 
accidental  consequence  more  important  even 
than  the  perpetuation  of  the  Union. 

As  before  stated,  it  is  our  union  as  a  people. 

The  war  established  the  paramount  claim  of 
the  general  government  on  the  personal  al 
legiance  of  every  man  in  the  country. 


82  POLITICAL  CONSPIRACIES 

It  established  the  right  of  the  government  to 
punish  everv  man  in  the  country  for  a  violation 
of  its  laws.  Mr.  Calhoun  claimed  that  a  State 
could  throw  the  aegis  of  its  protection  over  any 
citizen,  and  thus  nullify  the  power  of  the  gen 
eral  government.  This  will  never  be  seriously 
claimed  again. 

It  has  established  for  us  as  a  fact  that  which 
was  once  held  by  a  few  as  a  metaphysical  the 
ory,  that  the  true  principle  of  nationality  is  the 
cohesive  power  of  race. 

This  may  seem  to  be  a  merely  plausible  plati 
tude.  Yet  it  is  a  self-evident  deduction.  Peo 
ple  of  the  same  race,  when  living  contiguously, 
will,  of  course,  speak  the  same  language.  Un 
der  this  great  bond  of  union,  they  are  likely  to 
be  subject  to  the  influence  of  the  same  laws  and 
literature.  Consequently,  their  tastes  and  am 
bitions  will  be  given  the  same  bent.  Living 
and  laboring  under  the  same  conditions,  they 
will  have  the  same  temptations  to  vice,  the  same 
incentives  to  virtue.  They  will  find  it  to  their 
advantage  to  combine  in  business  enterprises, 
and  this  can  only  be  successfully  done  by  people 
who  speak  the  same  language  and  have  been 
raised  in  the  same  way.  In  fine,  masses  of 
men  moving  in  the  same  direction  and  under 
similar  conditions  have  to  combine. 


PRECEDING  THE  REBELLION.  83 

There  were  many  of  the  last  generation  who 
thought  they  could  escape  the  effect  of  this  law 
of  race.  We  know  now  that  any  community 
which  would  claim  independent  action  in  the 
midst  of  any  of  the  great  nationalities  of  our  day 
would  suffer  annihilation.  The  time  when  dy 
nasties  and  factions  can  stand  in  the  way  of 
national  progress,  or  interfere  with  the  autono 
mous  action  of  a  race,  is  past. 

Without  considering  these  facts  and  weighing 
these  considerations,  we  cannot  fairly  estimate 
the  political  problem  of  Sumter. 

It  was  not  a  question  of  blood  and  bones, 
and  bricks  and  mortar. 

"  It  was  not  all  of  life  to  live, 
Nor  all  of  death  to  die." 

A  question  of  national  existence,  and,  more 
than  that,  of  national  character,  hung  upon  the 
issue. 

From  the  time  Major  Anderson  went  to  Fort 
Moultrie  to  the  time  he  left  Sumter,  it  is  hard 
to  characterize  the  course  of  both  the  Buchanan 
and  the  Lincoln  administrations  in  dignified  yet 
appropriate  terms.  Now  that  their  despatches 
have  been  published,  it  is  evident  that  both  ad 
ministrations  wished  that  officer  to  relieve  them 
of  responsibility  by  taking  his  own  course. 


84  POLITICAL   CONSPIRACIES 

Probably  neither  could  have  relieved  Sumter 
without  risking  the  safety  of  Washington.  Nor 
could  they  abandon  without  sacrificing  a  prin 
ciple,  so  both  temporized  and  left  the  garrison 
of  Sumter  to  its  fate. * 

If  Major  Anderson  had  disobeyed  his  orders 
and  fought,  he  would  have  been  whipped. 
Then  he  could  have  been  made  a  scape-goat, 
and  cashiered.  Had  he  capitulated  before  a 
fight,  he  would  have  been  equally  open  to  cen 
sure. 

He  felt  that  he  was  badly  treated  and  said 
so,  yet  in  spite  of  this,  and  in  disregard  of  per 
sonal  sympathies  and  friendships,  he  was  true 
to  his  duty. 

When  Marshal  Bazaine  was  tried  for  treason, 
he  said,  in  the  course  of  his  trial,  that  after  the 
Emperor  Napoleon  was  dethroned  he  did  not 
know  what  to  do.  "  What !  "  asked  the  Due 
D'Aumale,  the  president  of  his  court-martial, 
"  did  France  then  cease  to  exist  ?  " 

Major  Anderson  had  no  such  doubts.  He 
knew  he  had  a  country  to  cherish,  love,  and  de 
fend,  in  spite  of  mistakes  and  vacillations  of 
Cabinets  and  leaders.  After  the  first  overt  act 
of  war,  after  he  had  to  deal  with  facts,  the  great 
mind  of  Abraham  Lincoln  asserted  itself.  From 

1  See  Addenda. 


PRECEDING  THE  REBELLION.  85 

that  time  on  we  had  nothing  to  be  ashamed  of. 
From  that  time  on  we  had  grand,  not  petty, 
war  ;  statesmanship,  not  statecraft. 

As  stated  in  the  beginning,  the  political  con 
spiracies  which  preceded  our  civil  war  of  1861 
were  the  consequences  and  not  the  causes  of 
the  conflicting  interests  which  made  the  contest 
inevitable.  However  spontaneous  the  out 
burst  of  revolutions  and  rebellions  may  appear, 
their  force  must  at  first  be  directed  by  con 
spirators.  For,  to  overthrow  an  established 
government,  force  is  required,  combination  is 
essential,  and  secrecy  is  a  necessity.  Other 
wise  all  such  attempts  would  be  suppressed  in 
their  inception. 

It  was  on  the  5th  of  January,  1861,  the  day 
that  the  Star  of  the  West  started  for  the  relief 
of  Sumter,  that  the  Southern  leaders  in  Wash 
ington  held  their  secret  caucus  in  which  they 
organized  their  rebellion.  This  course  had  been 
determined  long  before,  but  it  was  on  this  oc 
casion  that  these  four  resolutions  were  adopted. 
To  wit : 

i st.  The  cotton  States  should  secede  imme 
diately. 

2d.  Delegates  should  be  chosen  to  meet  in 
Montgomery,  Ala.,  on  Feb.  i5th,  to  organize 
a  provisional  government. 


86  POLITICAL  CONSPIRACIES. 

3d.  That  the  conspirators  should  remain  in 
the  Federal  Congress  during  the  Buchanan  Ad 
ministration,  to  obstruct  coercive  legislation  ; 
and 

4th.  Davis,  Mallory,  and  Slidell  were  ap 
pointed  a  committee  to  carry  out  the  objects  of 
the  meeting. 

That  their  conspiracies  utterly  failed  was 
owing  to  the  fact,  which  was  so  impressively 
stated  by  Mr.  Webster  in  the  Senate  in  i85o, 
"  that  the  machinations  of  men  are  powerless 
against  the  laws  of  nature." 

Under  the  directive  force  01  moral  laws  the 
balance  between  the  centrifugal  and  centripetal 
forces  of  our  political  system  seems  to  be  re 
established,  and  let  us  hope  that  in  the  future, 
as  in  the  past,  "  Treason  can  but  peep  to  what 
it  would." 

THE    END. 


ADDENDA. 


Reports  of  Generals  Anderson  and  Beauregard  of  the 
bombardment  and  evacuation  of  Fort  Sumter. 

TELEGRAM. 

STEAMSHIP  Baltic,  OFF  SANDY  HOOK, 

April  1 8  (1861),  10:30  A.M.  via  NEW  YORK. 

Having  defended  Fort  Sumter  for  thirty-four  hours, 
until  the  quarters  were  entirely  burned,  the  main  gates 
destroyed  by  fire,  the  gorge  walls  seriously  injured,  the 
magazine  surrounded  by  flames,  and  its  door  closed  from 
the  effect  of  heat,  four  barrels  and  three  cartridges  of 
powder  only  being  available,  and  no  provisions  remain 
ing  but  pork,  I  accepted  terms  of  evacuation  offered  by 
General  Beauregard,  being  the  same  offered  by  him  on 
the  nth  inst.,  prior  to  the  commencement  of  hostilities, 
and  marched  out  of  the  fort  Sunday  afternoon,  the  i4th 
inst.,  with  colors  flying  and  drums  beating,  bringing  away 
company  and  private  property,  and  saluting  my  flag  with 

fifty  guns. 

ROBERT  ANDERSON, 

Major  First  Artillery,  Commanding. 

Hon.  S.  CAMERON, 

Secretary  of  War,    Washington. 
8? 


88  ADDENDA. 

REPLY. 

WAR  DEPARTMENT,  WASHINGTON, 

AtiHl  20,  1 86 1. 
Major  ROBERT  ANDERSON, 

Late  Commanding  at  Fort  Sumter  : 

MY  DEAR  SIR. — I  am  directed  by  the  President  of  the 
United  States  to  communicate  to  you,  and  through  you 
to  the  officers  and  men  of  your  command  at  Forts  Moul- 
trie  and  Sumter,  the  approbation  of  the  government  of 
your  and  their  judicious  and  gallant  conduct  there,  and 
to  tender  you  and  them  the  thanks  of  the  government 
for  the  same. 

SIMON  CAMERON, 

Secretary  of  War. 

GENERAL  BEAUREGARD'S   REPORT. 

HDQRS.  PROVISIONAL  ARMY,  CHARLESTON,  S.  C. 

April  27,  1 86 1. 

SIR. — I  have  the  honor  to  submit  the  following  detailed 
report  of  the  bombardment  and  surrender  of  Fort  Sum 
ter  and  the  incidents  connected  therewith.  Having  com 
pleted  my  channel  defences  and  batteries  in  the  harbor 
necessary  for  the  reduction  of  Fort  Sumter,  I  dispatched 
two  of  my  aids  at  2:20  P.M.,  on  Thursday,  the  nth  of 
April,  with  a  communication  to  Major  Anderson,  in  com 
mand  of  the  fortification,  demanding  its  evacuation.  I 
offered  to  transport  himself  and  command  to  any  port  in 
the  United  States  he  might  elect,  to  allow  him  to  move 
out  of  the  fort  with  company  arms  and  property  and  all 
private  property,  and  to  salute  his  flag  in  lowering  it.  He 
refused  to  accede  to  the  demand.  As  my  aids  were 
about  leaving,  Major  Anderson  remarked  that  if  we  did 


ADDENDA.  89 

not  batter  him  to  pieces  he  would  be  starved  out  in  a 
few  days,  or  words  to  that  effect.  This  being  reported 
to  me  by  my  aids  on  their  return  with  his  refusal  at 
5:10  P.M.,  I  deemed  it  proper  to  telegraph  the  purport  of 
his  remark  to  the  Secretary  of  War.  In  reply  I  received 
by  telegraph  the  following  instructions  at  9:10  P.M. 

"  Do  not  desire  needlessly  to  bombard  Fort  Sumter.  If 
Major  Anderson  will  state  the  time  at  which,  as  indicated 
by  him,  he  will  evacuate,  and  agree  that  in  the  meantime 
he  will  not  use  his  guns  against  us  unless  ours  should  be 
employed  against  Fort  Sumter,  you  are  authorized  thus 
to  avoid  effusion  of  blood.  If  this,  or  its  equivalent,  be 
refused,  reduce  the  fort  as  your  judgment  decides  most 
practicable." 

At  i  P.M.  I  sent  my  aids  with  a  communication  to 
Major  Anderson,  based  on  the  foregoing  instructions.  It 
was  placed  in  his  hands  at  12:45  A-M->  I2th  inst.  He 
expressed  his  willingness  to  evacuate  the  fort  on  Monday 
at  noon,  if  provided  with  the  necessary  means  of  trans 
portation,  and  if  he  should  not  receive  contradictory  in 
structions  from  his  government  or  additional  supplies, 
but  he  declined  to  agree  not  to  open  his  guns  on  us  in 
the  event  of  any  hostile  demonstrations  on  our  part 
against  his  flag.  This  reply,  which  was  opened  and  shown 
to  my  aids,  plainly  indicated  that  if  instructions  should 
be  received  contrary  to  his  purpose  to  evacuate,  or  if  he 
should  receive  his  supplies,  or  if  the  Confederate  troops 
should  fire  on  hostile  troops  of  the  United  States,  or  upon 
transports  bearing  the  United  States  flag,  containing  men, 
munitions,  and  supplies  designed  for  hostile  operations 
against  us,  he  would  still  feel  himself  bound  to  fire  upon  us, 
and  to  hold  possession  of  the  fort.  As  in  consequence  of 
a  communication  from  the  President  of  the  United  States 
to  the  governor  of  South  Carolina,  we  were  in  momentary 


9°  ADDENDA. 

expectation  of  an  attempt  to  reinforce  Fort  Sumter,  or 
of  a  descent  upon  our  coast  to  that  end  from  the  United 
States  fleet  then  lying  at  the  entrance  of  the  harbor,  it 
was  manifest  by  an  imperative  necessity  to  reduce  the 
port  as  speedily  as  possible,  and  not  to  wait  until  the 
ships  and  the  fort  should  unite  in  a  combined  attack 
upon  us.  Accordingly  my  aids,  carrying  out  my  instruc 
tions,  promptly  refused  to  accede  to  the  terms  proposed 
by  Major  Anderson,  and  notified  him  in  writing  that 
our  batteries  would  open  on  Fort  Sumter  in  one  hour. 
This  notification  was  given  at  3:20  A.M.  of  Friday  the 
1 2th  instant.  The  signal  shell  was  fired  at  Fort  Johnson 
at  4:30  A.M.  At  about  5  o'clock  the  fire  of  our  batter 
ies  became  general.  Fort  Sumter  did  not  open  fire  until 
7  o'clock,  when  it  commenced  with  a  vigorous  fire  upon 
the  Cummings'  Point  iron  battery.  The  enemy  next  di 
rected  his  fire  upon  the  enfilade  battery  on  Sullivan's 
Island,  constructed  to  sweep  the  parapet  of  Fort  Sumter,  to 
prevent  the  working  of  the  barbette  guns,  and  to  dismount 
them.  This  was  also  the  aim  of  the  floating  battery,  the 
Dalhgren  battery,  and  the  gun  batteries  at  Cummings' 
Point.  The  enemy  next  opened  on  Fort  Moultrie,  be 
tween  which  and  Fort  Sumter  a  steady  and  almost  con 
stant  fire  was  kept  up  throughout  the  day.  These  three 
points — Fort  Moultrie,  Cummings'  Point,  and  the  end  of 
Sullivan's  Island,  where  the  floating  battery,  Dahlgren 
battery,  and  the  enfilade  battery  were  placed — were  the 
points  to  which  the  enemy  seemed  almost  to  confine  his 
attention,  although  he  fired  a  number  of  shots  at  Captain 
Butler's  mortar  battery,  situated  to  the  east  of  Fort  Moul 
trie,  and  a  few  at  Captain  James'  mortar  batteries  at 
Fort  Johnson.  During  the  day  (i2th  instant)  the  fire  of 
my  batteries  was  kept  up  most  spiritedly,  the  guns  and 
mortars  being  worked  in  the  coolest  manner,  preserving 


ADDENDA.  91 

the  prescribed  intervals  of  firing.  Toward  evening  it  be 
came  evident  that  our  fire  was  very  effective,  as  the  enemy 
was  driven  from  his  barbette  gun  which  he  attempted  to 
work  in  the  morning,  and  his  fire  was  confined  to  his 
casemated  guns,  but  in  a  less  active  manner  than  in  the 
morning,  and  it  was  observed  that  several  of  his  guns  en 
barbette  were  disabled.  During  the  whole  of  Friday  night 
our  mortar  batteries  continued  to  throw  shells,  but,  in 
obedience  to  orders,  at  longer  intervals.  The  night  was 
rainy  and  dark  ;  and  as  it  was  almost  confidently  expected 
that  the  United  States  fleet  would  attempt  to  land  troops 
upon  the  islands  or  to  throw  men  into  Fort  Sumter  by 
means  of  boats,  the  greatest  vigilance  was  observed  at  all 
our  channel  batteries,  and  by  our  troops  on  both  Morris 
and  Sullivan's  islands. 

Early  on  Saturday  morning  all  our  batteries  reopened 
upon  Fort  Sumter,  which  responded  vigorously  for  a  time, 
directing  its  fire  specially  against  Fort  Moultrie.  About 
8  o'clock  A.M.,  smoke  was  seen  issuing  from  the  quarters 
of  Fort  Sumter.  Upon  this  the  fire  of  our  batteries  was 
increased,  as  a  matter  of  course,  for  the  purpose  of 
bringing  the  enemy  to  terms  as  speedily  as  possible,  inas 
much  as  his  flag  was  still  floating  defiantly  above  him. 
Fort  Sumter  continued  to  fire  from  time  to  time,  but  at 
long  and  irregular  intervals,  amid  the  dense  smoke,  flying 
shot,  and  bursting  shell.  Our  brave  troops,  carried  away 
by  their  natural,  generous  impulses,  mounted  the  differ 
ent  batteries,  and  at  every  discharge  from  the  fort  cheered 
the  garrison  for  its  pluck  and  gallantry,  and  hooted  the 
fleet  lying  inactive  just  outside  the  bar. 

About  1.30  P.M.,  it  being  reported  to  me  that  the  flag 
was  down  (it  afterward  appeared  that  the  flag-staff  had 
been  shot  away),  and  the  conflagration,  from  the  large 
volume  of  smoke  being  apparently  on  the  increase,  I  sent 
three  of  my  aids  with  a  message  to  Maior  Anderson  to 


92  ADDENDA. 

the  effect  that,  seeing  his  flag  no  longer  flying,  his  quar 
ters  in  flames,  and  supposing  him  to  be  in  distress,  I  de 
sired  to  offer  him  any  assistance  he  might  stand  in  need 
of.  Before  my  aids  reached  the  fort  the  United  States 
flag  was  displayed  on  the  parapet,  but  remained  there 
only  a  short  time  when  it  was  hauled  down  and  a  white 
flag  substituted  in  its  place.  When  the  United  States 
flag  first  disappeared,  the  firing  from  our  batteries  almost 
entirely  ceased,  but  reopened  with  increased  vigor  when 
it  reappeared  on  the  parapet,  and  was  continued  until  the 
white  flag  was  raised,  when  it  entirely  ceased.  Upon  the 
arrival  of  my  aids  at  Fort  Sumter  they  delivered  their 
message  to  Major  Anderson,  who  replied  that  he  thanked 
me  for  my  offer,  but  desired  no  assistance.  Just  previous 
to  their  arrival  Col.  Wigfall,  one  of  my  aids,  who  had  been 
detached  for  special  duty  on  Morris  Island,  had,  by  order 
of  Brigadier-Gen.  Simons,  crossed  over  to  Fort  Sumter 
from  Cummings'  Point,  in  an  open  boat,  with  private  Gour- 
din  Young,  amidst  a  heavy  fire  of  shot  and  shell,  for  the 
purpose  of  ascertaining  from  Major  Anderson  whether  his 
intention  was  to  surrender,  his  flag  being  down  and  his 
quarters  in  flames.  On  reaching  the  fort  the  colonel  had 
an  interview  with  Major  Anderson,  the  result  of  which 
was  that  Major  Anderson  understood  him  as  offering  the 
same  conditions  on  the  part  of  General  Beauregard  as 
had  been  tendered  him  on  the  nth  instant,  while  Colonel 
Wigfall's  impression  was  that  Major  Anderson  uncon 
ditionally  surrendered,  trusting  to  the  generosity  of  Gen 
eral  Beauregard  to  offer  such  terms  as  would  be  honor 
able  and  acceptable  to  both  parties.  Meanwhile,  before 
these  circumstances  were  reported  to  me,  and  in  fact  as 
soon  as  the  aids  I  had  dispatched  with  offers  of  assist 
ance  had  set  out  on  their  mission,  hearing  that  a  white 
flag  was  flying  over  the  fort,  I  sent  Major  Jones,  my 
chief-of-staff,  and  some  other  aids,  with  substantially  the 


ADDENDA.  93 

same  propositions  I  had  submitted  to  Major  Anderson  on 
the  nth  hist,  with  the  exception  of  the  privilege  of  sa 
luting  his  flag.  The  Major  (Anderson)  replied  :  "  it  would 
be  exceedingly  gratifying  to  him,  as  well  as  his  command, 
to  be  permitted  to  salute  their  flag,  having  so  gallantly 
defended  the  fort  under  such  trying  circumstances,  and 
hoped  that  General  Beauregard  would  not  refuse  it,  as 
such  privilege  was  not  unusual."  He  further  said  he 
"would  not  urge  the  point,  but  would  prefer  to  refer  the 
matter  to  me."  The  point  was,  therefore,  left  open  until 
the  matter  was  submitted  to  me.  Previous  to  the  return 
of  Major  Jones,  I  sent  a  fire-engine,  under  Mr.  M.  H. 
Nathan,  chief  of  the  fire  department,  and  Surgeon-Gen 
eral  Gibbes  of  South  Carolina,  with  several  of  my  aids, 
to  offer  further  assistance  to  the  garrison  of  Fort  Sumter, 
which  was  declined.  I  very  cheerfully  agreed  to  allow 
the  salute,  as  an  honorable  testimony  to  the  gallantry  and 
fortitude  with  which  Major  Anderson  and  his  command 
had  defended  their  fort,  and  I  informed  Major  Anderson 
of  my  decision  about  7  J  o'clock,  through  Major  Jones,  my 
chief-of-staff. 

The  arrangements  being  completed,  Major  Anderson 
embarked  with  his  command  on  the  transport  prepared  to 
convey  him  to  the  United  States  fleet  lying  outside  the  bar, 
and  the  troops  immediately  garrisoned  the  fort,  and  be 
fore  sunset  the  flag  of  the  Confederate  States  floated  over 
the  ramparts  of  Fort  Sumter. 

*  *  *  *  *  *  i 

I  am,  sir,  very  respectfully, 

vour  obedient  servant, 

G.  T.  BEAUREGARD, 

Brigadier-General  Com'dg. 

Hon.  L.  P.  WALKER, 

Secretary  of  War. 
1  The  omitted  part  embraced  only  compliments  to  his  command. 


APPENDIX. 


The  Confederate  leaders  profited  by  the  lesson  given  by  Major  An 
derson  in  his  seizure  of  Sumter,  by  taking  the  forts  within  their 
borders,  either  before  they  passed  their  ordinance  of  secession  or  a  few 
days  after.  In  most  instances  Messrs.  Floyd  and  Cooper  had  taken 
care  that  good  reliable  rebels  were  in  command  at  important  posts. 

A  brief  resume  may  be  interesting  as  a  reminiscence. 

Georgia  passed  its  ordinance  of  secession  January  19,  1861. 

Fort  Pulaski  was  seized  on  January  3d  ;  Augusta  Arsenal,  January 
24th  ;  Oglethorp  Barracks  and  Fort  Jackson,  on  January  26th. 

Fort  Pulaski  was  in  charge  of  Captain  Wm.  H.  C.  Whiting,  Capt. 
of  U.  S.  Engineers,  born  in  the  State  of  Maine ;  subsequently 
General  Whiting,  C.  S.  A.,  Chief  Engineer  in  Charleston  Harbor, 
and  later  on  at  Fort  Fisher. 

Augusta  Arsenal  was  garrisoned  by  Captain  Elzey,  2d  Artillery, 
and  his  company.  Captain  Elzey  surrendered  without  firing  a  shot, 
and  became  General  Elzey,  C.  S.  A. 

It  was  also  the  painful  duty  of  Captain  Whiting  to  report  the  sur 
render  of  Oglethorp  Barracks  and  of  Fort  Jackson. 

An  ordinance  of  secession  was  adopted  in  Mississippi  on  January 
Qth,  and  in  Alabama  on  January  n,  1861. 

The  arsenal  at  Mount  Vernon  was  seized  by  State  troops  January 
4th,  and  Forts  Morgan  and  Gaineson  the  5th. 

Governor  Moore,  of  Alabama,  wrote  to  his  Excellency  James 
Buchanan  as  follows  :  "  Sir  :  In  a  spirit  of  frankness  I  hasten  to  in 
form  you  by  letter  that,  by  my  order,  the  above-named  forts  and  ar 
senal  have  been  peacefully  occupied  and  are  now  held  by  the  troops 
of  the  State  of  Alabama. 

******** 

"  I  deem  it  my  duty  to  take  every  precautionary  step  to  make  the 
secession  of  the  State  peaceful,  and  prevent  detriment  to  my  people. 
******** 

"  The  purpose  with  which  my  order  was  given,  and  has  been  exe 
cuted,  was  to  avoid  and  not  to  provoke  hostilities  between  the  State 
and  Federal  governments,"  (Page  327,  "Confederate  Correspond 
ence.")  And  so  on  for  quantity. 

Imagine  the  Fenians  seizing  Dublin  Castle  with  these  excuses. 

94 


APPENDIX.  95 

Florida  voted  on  the  ordinance  of  secession  on  January  loth. 
The  result  could  not  have  been  known  for  a  week,  yet  the  arsenal  at 
Apalachicola  was  seized  on  January  6th;  Fort  Marion,  St.  Augustine, 
January  7th;  Barrancas  Barracks,  Forts  Barrancas  and  McKee,  and 
the  Pensacola  Navy  Yard  were  seized,  and  the  surrender  of  Fort 
Pickens  was  demanded,  on  the  I2th. 

In  the  Confederate  correspondence  in  relation  to  Florida,  p.  348, 

sfg.,  there  is  some  interesting  reading. 

First  we  find  a  request  of  Senator  Yulee  to  the  Secretary  of  War, 
asking  a  list  of  army  officers  from  Florida,  with  rank  and  pay.  The 
information  was  given  by  Secretary  Floyd.  Next  we  find  a  request 
of  Yulee  and  Mallory  for  the  number  of  U.  S.  troops  in  Florida,  and 
the  amount  of  arms  and  ammunition  in  all  the  forts  and  arsenals  of  the 
State.  A  paper  giving  the  desired  information  in  full  was  made  out 
by  the  Ordnance  Department.  But  on  January  gth  it  suddenly  oc 
curred  to  Secretary  of  War  Holt,  that  "the  interests  of  the  ser 
vice  forbid  that  the  information  which  you  ask  should  at  this  moment 
be  made  public." 

One  fort  and  one  arsenal  had  already  been  forcibly  seized,  a  few 
days  before,  by  the  constituents  of  the  Honorable  Senators. 

The  U.  S.  steamer  Brooklyn  arrived  off  Pensacola  with  reinforce 
ments  for  Fort  Pickens  on  February  6,  1861. 

These  troops  were  kept  on  board  the  steamer  by  a  secret  under 
standing  with  the  rebels,  called  an  informal  truce,  from  that  date  to 
the  1 2th  of  April,  when  they  were  landed. 

On  the  23d  of  January,  1861,  a  special  messenger  of  the  govern 
ment,  Lieutenant  Saunders,  was  arrested  as  a  prisoner  of  war  at  Pen 
sacola. 

January  26th,  Secretary  Holt  telegraphs  General  Scott:  "The 
President  is  much  disturbed  by  a  telegraphic  despatch  which  an 
nounces  that  the  Brooklyn  has  sailed  with  two  companies  instead  of 
one  as  ordered."  (Vol.  I,  p.  454,  "  Rebellion  Record.") 

On  the  same  page  we  have  the  explanation  of  the  disturbance  of 
the  Executive  intellect. 

"  PENSACOLA,  January  28,  1861. 

4 '  To  Hon.  JOHN  SLIDELL,  or,  in  his  absence,  Hon.  R.  W.  HUNTER, 
or  Governor  BIGLER  : 

"  We  hear  the  Brooklyn  is  coming  with  reinforcements  for  Fort 
Pickens.  No  attack  on  its  garrison  is  contemplated,  but,  on  the  con 
trary,  we  desire  to  keep  the  peace,  and  if  the  present  status  be  pre 
served  we  will  guarantee  that  no  attack  will  be  made  upon  it,  but  if 
reinforcements  be  attempted,  resistance  and  a  bloody  conflict  seem 
inevitable.  Should  the  government  thus  attempt  to  augment  its  force 
— when  no  possible  call  for  it  exists,  when  we  are  preserving  a  peace 
ful  policy — an  assault  may  be  made  upon  the  fort  at  a  moment's 
warning.  All  preparations  are  made.  Our  whole  force — 1,700 
strong — will  regard  it  as  a  hostile  act.  Impress  this  upon  the  Presi 
dent,  and  urge  that  the  inevitable  consequence  of  reinforcement  un- 


90  APPENDIX. 

der  present  circumstances  is  instant  war,  as  peace  will  be  preserved  if 
no  reinforcements  be  attempted.  If  the  President  wants  an  assur 
ance  of  all  I  say  from  Colonel  Chase,  commanding  the  forces,  I  will 
transmit  it  at  once.  I  am  determined  to  stave  off  war  if  possible. 
Answer  promptly. 

"  S.  R.  MALLORY." 

It  is  evident  that  Slidell,  Hunter,  &  Co.  had  anticipated  Senator 

Mallory's  suggestions. 

The  despatch,  which  was  sent  by  Lieut.  Saunders  to  Commodore 

Armstrong,  and  which  was  taken  from  him  by  force,  was  in  words 

and  figures  as  follows  : 

"  WASHINGTON,  January  29,  1861. 

"To  James  Glynn,  commanding  the  Macedonian;  Capt.  W.  S. 
Walker,  commanding  the  Brooklyn,  and  other  naval  officers  in 
command  ;  and  Lieut.  Adam  J.  Slemmer,  First  Regiment  Artil 
lery,  U.  S.  Army,  commanding  Fort  Pickens,  Pensacola,  Fla.  : 

"  In  consequence  of  the  assurances  received  from  Mr.  Mallory  in  a 
telegram  of  yesterday  to  Messrs.  Slidell,  Hunter,  and  Bigler,  with 
a  request  it  should  be  laid  before  the  President,  that  Fort  Pickens 
would  not  be  assaulted,  and  an  offer  of  such  an  assurance  to  the  same 
effect  from  Colonel  Chase,  for  the  purpose  of  avoiding  a  hostile  col 
lision,  upon  receiving  satisfactory  assurances  from  Mr.  Mallory  and 
Colonel  Chase  that  Fort  Pickens  will  not  be  attacked,  you  are  in 
structed  not  to  land  the  company  on  board  the  Brooklyn  unless  said 
fort  shall  be  attacked  or  preparations  shall  be  made  for  its  attack. 
The  provisions  necessary  for  the  supply  of  the  fort  you  will  land. 
The  Brooklyn  and  other  vessels  of  war  on  the  station  will  remain, 
and  you  will  exercise  the  utmost  vigilance  and  be  prepared  at  a 
moment's  warning  to  land  the  company  at  Fort  Pickens,  and  you  and 
they  will  instantly  repel  an  attack  on  the  fort. 

' '  The  President  yesterday  sent  a  special  message  to  Congress  com 
mending  the  Virginia  resolution  of  compromise.  The  Commissioners 
of  different  States  are  to  meet  here  on  Monday,  the  4th  February, 
and  it  is  important  that  during  their  session  a  collision  of  arms  should 
be  avoided,  unless  an  attack  should  be  made  or  there  should  be 
preparation  for  such  an  attack.  In  either  event  the  Brooklyn  and 
the  other  vessels  will  act  promptly. 

"  Your  right,  and  that  of  the  other  officers  in  command  at  Pensacola, 
freely  to  communicate  with  the  government  by  special  messenger, 
and  its  right  in  the  same  manner  to  communicate  with  yourself  and 
them,  will  remain  intact  as  the  basis  on  which  the  present  instruction 
is  given. 

' '  J.  HOLT,  Secretary  of  War. 

"  ISAAC  TOUCEY,  Secretary  of  the  Navy." 

This  was  the  basis  of  the  famous  truce  under  which  the  Confeder 
ates  erected  batteries  all  around  Pickens,  as  they  did  about  Sumter. 
It  was  on  the  1st  of  April  that  General  Scott  signed  the  order 


APPENDIX.  97 

placing  Bvt.  Lieut. -Colonel  Harvey  Brown  in  command  of  the  secret 
expedition  for  the  relief  of  Fort  Pickens,  of  which  the  Powhatan 
formed  a  part. 

The  following  extracts  from  General  Meig's  letter  to  General  Tot- 
ten,  p.  394,  partly  explain  the  Powhatan  mystery  : 

"  The  uncertainty  of  the  government  as  to  the  condition  of  Fort 
Pickens,  and  as  to  the  very  orders  and  instructions  under  which  the 
squadron  off  that  fortress  was  acting,  led  to  apprehensions  lest  the 
place  might  be  taken  before  relief  could  reach  it. 

' '  A  landing  in  boats  from  the  mainland  on  a  stormy  night  was  per 
fectly  practicable,  in  spite  of  the  utmost  efforts  of  a  fleet  anchored 
outside  and  off  the  bar  to  prevent  it.  Such  a  landing  in  force,  taking 
possession  of  the  low  flank  embrasures  by  men  armed  with  revolvers, 
would  be  likely  to  sweep  in  a  few  minutes  over  the  ramparts  of  Fort 
Pickens,  defended  by  only  forty  soldiers  and  forty  ordinary  men  from 
the  navy  yard,  a  force  which  did  not  allow  one  man  to  be  kept  at  each 
flanking  gun. 

4 '  Believing  that  a  ship-of-war  could  be  got  ready  for  sea  and  reach 
Pensacola  before  any  expedition  in  force,  I  advised  the  sending  of 
such  a  ship  under  a  young  and  energetic  commander,  with  orders  to 
enter  the  harbor  without  stopping,  and,  once  in,  to  prevent  any  boat 
expedition  from  the  main  to  Santa  Rosa. 

"  Capt.  David  D.  Porter  readily  undertook  this  dangerous  duty,  and, 
proceeding  to  New  York,  succeeded  in  fitting  out  the  Powhatan,  and 
sailed  on  the  6th  for  his  destination. 

******* 

"On  the  morning  of  the  I7th,  while  engaged  in  landing  the  horses, 
the  Poivhatan,  which  we  had  passed  without  seeing  her  during  the 
voyage,  hove  in  sight.  A  note  from  Colonel  Brown  advised  me  that 
in  his  opinion  her  entrance  into  the  harbor  at  that  time  would  bring 
on  a  collision,  which  it  was  very  important  to  defer  until  our  stores, 
guns,  and  ammunition  were  disposed  of. 

' '  As  the  enemy  did  not  seem  inclined  yet  to  molest  us  ;  as  with  600 
troops  in  the  fort  and  three  war  steamers  anchored  close  inshore, 
there  was  no  danger  of  a  successful  attempt  at  a  landing  by  the 
enemy,  it  was  evident  that  it  was  important  to  prevent  a  collision, 
and  her  entrance  would  have  uselessly  exposed  a  gallant  officer  and  a 
devoted  crew  to  extreme  dangers. 

"  The  circumstances  had  changed  since  Captain  Porter's  orders  had 
been  issued  by  the  President.  Knowing  the  imperative  nature  of 
these  orders,  and  the  character  of  him  who  bore  them,  I  feared  that 
it  would  not  be  possible  to  arrest  his  course  ;  but  requesting  the  com 
mander  of  the  Wyandotte,  on  board  of  which  I  fortunately  found  my 
self  at  the  time  I  received  Colonel  Brown's  letter,  to  get  under  way 
and  place  his  vessel  across  the  path  of  the  Powhatan,  making  signal 
that  I  wished  to  speak  with  him,  I  succeeded  at  length,  in  spite  of  his 
changes  of  course  and  his  disregard  of  our  signals,  in  stopping  this 
vessel,  which  steered  direct  for  the  perilous  channel  on  which 
frowned  the  guns  of  McKee,  Barrancas,  and  many  newly  constructed 
batteries. 


98  APPENDIX. 

11 1  handed  to  Captain  Porter  Colonel  Brown's  letter,  indorsed  upon 
it  my  hearty  concurrence  in  its  advice,  which,  under  his  authority  from 
the  Executive,  had  the  force  of  an  order  from  the  President  himself, 
and  brought  the  Powhatan  to  anchor  near  the  Atlantic^  in  position  to 
sweep  with  her  guns  the  landing-place  and  its  communications. 

"The  Brooklyn  shortly  afterward  anchored  east  of  the  A  tlan  tic, 
and  the  Wyandotte  took  up  position  near  her." 

But  why  first  assign  the  Powhatan ,  first  assigned  to  the  Sumter  ex 
pedition,  and  then  transferred  without  the  knowledge  of  either  the 
Secretaries  of  War  or  the  Navy  ? 

We  extract  a  few  interesting  extracts  from  the  "  Confederate  Cor 
respondence,"  p.  443,  etscq.  : 

41  I  shall  give  the  enemy  a  shot  next  week  before  retiring  (from  the 
U.  S.  Senate).  I  say  enemy  !  Yes,  I  am  theirs,  and  they  are  mine. 
I  am  willing  to  be  their  masters,  but  not  their  brothers. 

"  Yours,  in  haste, 

"  D.  L.  YULEE." 

(Oh,  shade  of  Lindley  Murray  hover  o'er  us  !) 

"  WASHINGTON,  January  7,  1861. 
"JOSEPH  FINEGAN,  Esq.  (Tallahassee,  Fla.) : 

"  MY  DEAR  SIR  :  On  the  other  side  (following)  is  a  copy  of  reso 
lutions  adopted  at  a  consultation  of  the  Senators  from  the  seceding 
States,  in  which  Georgia,  Alabama,  Louisiana,  Arkansas,  Texas,  Mis 
sissippi,  and  Florida  were  present. 

4 '  The  idea  of  the  meeting  was  that  the  States  should  go  out  at  once, 
and  provide  for  an  early  organization  of  a  Confederate  government, 
not  later  than  isth  February.  This  time  is  allowed  to  enable  Louisi 
ana  and  Texas  to  participate.  It  seemed  to  be  the  opinion  that  if  we 
left  here,  force,  loan,  and  volunteer  bills  might  be  passed,  which 
would  put  Mr.  Lincoln  in  immediate  condition  for  hostilities  ;  where 
as,  by  remaining  in  our  places  until  the  4th  March,  it  is  thought  we 
can  keep  the  hands  of  Mr.  Buchanan  tied,  and  disable  the  Republicans 
from  effecting  any  legislation  which  will  strengthen  the  hands  of  the 
incoming  Administration. 

******** 
"  In  haste,  yours  truly, 

"D.  L.  YULEE." 

How  secret  the  Pensacola  expedition  was  may  be  seen  from  the 
following  despatches  : 

"  AUGUSTA,  March  20,  1861. 
"  President  DAVIS: 

"  My  always  reliable  Washington  correspondent  says  :  '  Evident 
Lincoln  intends  to  reinforce  Pickens,' 

"WM.  H.  PRITCHARD." 


APPENDIX.  99 

"WAR  DEPARTMENT,  A.  AND  I.  G.  O. 

"MONTGOMERY,  April  6,   l86l. 

"Brig.-Gen.  BRAXTON  BRAGG: 

"  The  government  at  Washington  have  determined  to  reinforce  Fort 
Pickens,  and  troops  are  now  leaving  for  that  purpose. 

"S.  COOPER, 
"Adjutant  and  Inspector-General. " 

North  Carolina  seceded  May  2Oth.  Forts  Caswell  and  Johnston 
were  seized  April  i6th.  The  arsenal  at  Fayetteville  was  surrendered 
by  Capt.  S.  S.  Anderson,  U.  S.  A.,  subsequently  C.  S.  A.,  April 
22d.  He  had  forty-two  men,  but  made  no  resistance. 

Louisiana  seceded  on  January  26th.  The  U.  S.  arsenal  and  bar 
racks  at  Baton  Rouge  were  seized,  January  loth  ;  Forts  Jackson  and 
Saint  Philip,  January  nth;  Fort  Pike,  January  14  ;  Fort  Macon,  Jan 
uary  28th.  Paymaster's  funds  and  ail  government  property  were  soon 
after  taken  in  New  Orleans. 

The  form  of  the  demand  was  the  same  in  all  cases.  To  wit :  "  In 
the  name  of  the  Sovereign  State  of  Louisiana,  I  now  demand,"  etc., 
etc. 

The  ordinance  of  secession  was  adopted  by  the  Arkansas  Conven 
tion,  May  6th  ;  all  the  U.  S.  forts  and  property  within  the  borders  of 
that  State  and  the  Indian  Territory  were  seized  before  the  secession 
of  Arkansas. 

In  Texas  no  hostile  demonstrations  were  made  against  the  U.  S. 
Government  until  after  the  passage  of  the  ordinance  of  secession, 
February  I,  1861. 

There  is  only  one  thing  important  to  note  in  connection  with  our 
subject,  and  that  is,  that  although  General  Twiggs,  commanding  that 
Department,  commenced  writing  for  instructions  as  early  as  Decem 
ber  13,  1860,  and  wrote  urgently  over  and  over  again,  he  only  re 
ceived  one  non-committal  letter  from  General  Scott's  Aid. 

It  was  evident  from  the  time  of  his  first  letter  that  he  did  not  in 
tend  to  support  the  government  in  coercive  measures.  In  subsequent 
letters  he  said  that  he  intended  only  to  be  a  looker-on,  and  that  he 
never  would  fire  on  an  American  citizen. 

Before  the  passage  of  the  ordinance  of  secession  Twiggs  would 
probably  have  collected  the  troops  under  his  command  and  marched 
them  to  any  place  the  government  might  have  designated. 

If,  on  the  other  hand,  the  government  wished  to  hold  Texas  by 
force,  the  troops  should  of  course  have  been  placed  under  the  com 
mand  of  some  able  and  loyal  officer,  and  concentrated  at  the  State 
capital. 

As  it  was,  Twiggs  was  relieved  by  Col.  Waite,  February  19,  1861. 

The  first  letter  of  instructions  to  Col.  Waite  is  a  military  curiosity: 


100  APPENDIX. 

4  HEAD-QUARTERS  OF  THE  ARMY, 

"  WASHINGTON,  February  4,  1861. 

"  Col.  C.  A.  WAITE,  U.  S.  Army, 

"  Commanding  Department  of  Texas,  San  Antonio  : 

4 '  SIR. — The  General-in-Chief  directs  me  to  write  you  as  follows  : 
To  relieve  Brevet  Major-General  Twiggs,  you  were  put  in  orders  the 
28th  ultimo  to  command,  according  to  your  brevet  rank,  the  Depart 
ment  of  Texas.  Instructions  followed  three  days  later  for  sending 
the  five  companies  of  artillery  on  the  Rio  Grande  to  Brazos  Santiago, 
there  to  be  embarked  in  a  steamer  (ordered  hence  to  meet  them), 
with  their  batteries  complete,  leaving  their  horses,  for  sale  or  other 
service,  behind.  If  necessary,  the  artillery  companies  will  be  re 
placed  by  detachments  of  infantry,  unless  Texas  should  in  the  mean 
time  have  declared  herself  out  of  the  Union. 

"  In  the  latter  case  you  will  wait  for  instructions  respecting  the  dis 
position  of  the  troops  (other  than  the  artillery)  under  your  command 
and  the  public  property  in  their  hands,  which  you  will  hold  and  pre 
serve. 

"  I  am,  etc., 

"L.  THOMAS." 

This  letter  was  written  not  by  the  traitor  Floyd  but  by  the  patriot 
Holt  ;  not  under  the  administration  of  poor  Pierce,  but  under  that 
of  the  veteran  statesman,  James  Buchanan. 

A  department  commander  is  told  that  instructions  will  only  be 
sent  him  as  to  his  arm  of  strength  after  the  State  in  which  he  is  com 
manding  may  have  seceded. 

This  letter  was  sent  at  a  time  when  the  government  had  learned  to 
its  sorrow  that  secession  meant  open  defiance,  spoliation,  or  war. 

"  Angels  and  ministers  of  grace  defend  us!" 


THIS   BOOK  IS  DUE  ON   THE  LAST  DATE 
STAMPED   BELOW 


RENEWED  BOOKS  ARE  SUBJECT  TO  IMMEDIATE 
RECALL 


UBRArtr 

1969 


MAY  6 


LIBRARY,  UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA,  DAVIS 

Book  Slip-35m-7,'62(D296s4)458 


I  Anderson,  T.M. 

Political  conspirac: 
>dine  the  rebellion 


Call  Number: 


EU71.1 


.  I 


255187 


